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ONE GOOD PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENOUGH 
AARON-ANDREW P. BRUHL† 
ABSTRACT 
  This Article concerns an aspect of Article III standing that has 
played a role in many of the highest-profile controversies of recent 
years, including litigation over the Affordable Care Act, immigration 
policy, and climate change. Although the federal courts constantly 
emphasize the importance of ensuring that only proper plaintiffs 
invoke the federal judicial power, the Supreme Court and other federal 
courts have developed a significant exception to the usual requirement 
of standing. This exception holds that a court entertaining a multiple-
plaintiff case may dispense with inquiring into the standing of each 
plaintiff as long as the court finds that one plaintiff has standing to 
pursue the claims before the court. This practice of partially bypassing 
the requirement of standing is not limited to cases in which the plaintiffs 
are about to lose on other grounds anyway. Put differently, courts are 
willing to proceed as if all plaintiffs have standing as long as one 
plaintiff has it, and they will then decide the merits for or against all 
plaintiffs despite doubts about the standing of some of those plaintiffs. 
We could call this the “one-plaintiff rule.” 
  This Article examines the one-plaintiff rule from normative and 
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positive perspectives. On the normative side, the goal is to establish that 
the one-plaintiff rule is erroneous in light of principle, precedent, and 
policy. All plaintiffs need standing, even if each presents similar legal 
claims and regardless of the form of relief they seek. To motivate the 
normative inquiry, the Article also explains that the one-plaintiff rule is 
harmful as a practical matter because it assigns the benefits and 
detriments of judgments to persons to whom they do not belong. The 
Article’s other principal goal is to explain the puzzle of how the 
mistaken one-plaintiff rule could have attained such widespread 
acceptance. The explanatory account assigns the blame for the one-
plaintiff rule to the incentives of courts and litigants as well as to the 
development of certain problematic understandings of the nature of 
judicial power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The fundamental principle of federal jurisdiction is that the 
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.1 They must 
scrupulously ensure that they do not exceed their rightful authority. 
One limitation on their authority, as set forth in Article III of the 
Constitution, is that the federal courts may only adjudicate genuine 
“cases or controversies” and may not address abstract questions of law 
or policy. The Supreme Court has gone so far as to declare that “[n]o 
principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our 
system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-
court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”2 The “case or 
controversy” limitation has generated the elaborate doctrine of 
standing to sue. To have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must 
have suffered an injury in fact that is traceable to the defendant’s 
1. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); see also
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173–76 (1803) (holding a federal statute 
unconstitutional because it conferred a type of jurisdiction not authorized by Article III). 
2. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) (emphasis added).
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conduct and likely to be redressed by the plaintiff’s requested remedy.3 
The Supreme Court frequently reiterates the importance of standing, 
calling it “an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case.”4 
Despite the importance that the federal courts attribute to Article 
III standing, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have 
developed a significant exception to the standing requirement. This 
exception holds that a court entertaining a multiple-plaintiff case may 
dispense with inquiring into the standing of each plaintiff as long as the 
court finds that one plaintiff has standing. Courts sometimes invoke 
this rule when the plaintiffs are about to lose on the merits anyway, but 
courts also invoke this rule even when the plaintiffs might, and 
ultimately do, prevail on the merits. In other words, courts are willing 
to proceed through the litigation process and eventually enter 
judgment on the merits for or against all plaintiffs, despite 
acknowledged doubts as to the standing of some of those plaintiffs. We 
could call this the “one-plaintiff rule” or, by analogy to the doctrine of 
supplemental jurisdiction,5 a form of supplemental-plaintiff standing. 
The one-plaintiff rule is applied with considerable frequency. It 
has been invoked in more than two dozen Supreme Court cases and 
probably hundreds of cases in the lower federal courts, and it has 
figured in several of the highest-profile cases of the last several years. 
Courts used the one-plaintiff rule in the litigation involving President 
Donald Trump’s travel ban,6 the Obama administration’s “deferred 
action” immigration program,7 the Affordable Care Act’s individual 
mandate,8 climate change,9 and same-sex marriage.10 In King v. 
3. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). In addition to the requirements of Article III,
there are also several “judicially self-imposed,” or prudential, restrictions on standing. See id. The 
focus of this Article is constitutional standing rather than prudential standing, though the latter 
doctrine does make an appearance at a few points. See infra Part III.E.5. 
4. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012) (providing that district courts may exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over certain claims related to a claim within their original jurisdiction).  
6. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 586 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc),
cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017), vacated as moot, No. 16-1436, 2017 WL 4518553 (U.S. Oct. 
10, 2017) (mem.).   
7. For a discussion of the use of the one-plaintiff rule in the deferred-action immigration
case, see infra text accompanying notes 29–31, 143–51. 
8. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243
(11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 
U.S. 519 (2012). 
9. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
10. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 370–71 (4th Cir. 2014).
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Burwell,11 the most recent Supreme Court case over the Affordable 
Care Act, the one-plaintiff rule may explain why the Court’s opinion 
did not address standing at all, despite the fact that there were very 
serious doubts about the standing of most of the plaintiffs in the case.12 
After all, the one-plaintiff rule meant that only one of the plaintiffs in 
King needed standing, and the federal government conceded that one 
plaintiff probably had it.13 Due to its role in the King litigation, the one-
plaintiff rule achieved the unusual distinction among standing 
doctrines of having been discussed in the popular press.14 
The one-plaintiff rule’s prevalence in judicial decisions far 
outstrips the amount of deliberation the courts have given it. This 
Article hopes to force a more thoughtful confrontation. It examines the 
one-plaintiff rule from both normative and positive perspectives. On 
the normative side, the Article aims to establish that the one-plaintiff 
rule is wrong as a matter of principle and, further, that it is practically 
harmful or at least not as practically beneficial as might be supposed. 
Therefore, courts should stop using it. Commentators, who rarely 
linger over the rule, should not endorse it.15 Instead, courts and 
11. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
12. See Nicholas Bagley, Do the Plaintiffs in King Have Standing to Sue?, INCIDENTAL 
ECONOMIST (Feb. 16, 2015), http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/do-the-plaintiffs-in-
king-have-standing-to-sue/ [https://perma.cc/J8TT-LFUZ]; Rob Weiner, King v. Burwell: 
Standing Pat or Standing Corrected, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 18, 2015), http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2015/02/king-v-burwell-standing-pat-or-standing.html [https://perma.cc/48FB-FLLY]. 
13. The issue of standing came up at the beginning of oral argument, but it was not pursued
very forcefully because both sides, and the Court, seemed to accept the one-plaintiff rule. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (No. 14-114) (Ginsburg, J.) (stating that 
“each plaintiff, or at least one plaintiff, has to have a concrete stake in these questions”); id. at 7 
(counsel for challengers) (stating that “it’s blackletter law that only one plaintiff needs standing”); 
id. at 39 (Solicitor General) (“[W]ith respect to standing, the question—the case or controversy 
question turns on whether any of the four Petitioners is liable for the tax penalty for 2014.”). 
14. E.g., Louise Radnofsky, Jess Bravin & Brent Kendall, Health-Law Challenger’s Standing 
in Supreme Court Case Is Questioned, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 6, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/health-law-challengers-standing-in-supreme-court-case-is-questioned-1423264458 
[https://perma.cc/P8BX-XWH9] (“Standing issues with these three [King v. Burwell] plaintiffs 
don’t jeopardize the case, legal experts say, because only one plaintiff needs standing for the suit 
to proceed before the court.”). 
15. The most substantial treatment of the rule, which endorses its validity, comes from Joan
Steinman, The Effects of Case Consolidation on the Procedural Rights of Litigants: What They 
Are, What They Might Be—Part 1: Justiciability and Jurisdiction (Original and Appellate), 42 
UCLA L. REV. 717, 726–50 (1995). Since that article was published, the one-plaintiff rule has 
become both more entrenched in judicial practice and, due to other doctrinal developments, more 
problematic. For a description of Steinman’s position and the impact of later developments, see 
infra note 155. 
BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017  11:16 AM 
486  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:481 
commentators should recognize that all plaintiffs in a case need 
standing, even if all of them present similar legal claims and seek only 
generalized injunctive or declaratory relief. And, importantly, one can 
and should reject the one-plaintiff rule even if one believes that 
modern standing doctrine has unduly limited access to the courts in 
many situations, particularly when Congress has created new statutory 
injuries. 
Turning to the positive side of the analysis, the Article attempts to 
explain the rule’s advent and general acceptance. Given the supposedly 
fundamental importance of the standing requirement, it is jarring to 
see courts treat it so casually. The situation calls out for an explanation 
of how such a mistake could arise and thrive. This Article attempts to 
provide one. 
The Article is organized as follows. Part I describes the one-
plaintiff rule, the exceptions to it, and the history behind it. Part II 
explores the one-plaintiff rule’s underappreciated harmful effects. The 
problems with the rule are not merely theoretical (though, as far as 
theory goes, the rule is unsound); rather, the rule assigns the concrete 
benefits and burdens of party status to persons who should not enjoy 
those benefits or bear those burdens. Part III then presents the case 
against the one-plaintiff rule by showing that it is inconsistent with the 
Constitution and the larger web of standing doctrine. Part III also sets 
forth the right way for courts to handle cases in which only some parties 
have standing. If implemented wisely, the rejection of the one-plaintiff 
rule need not cause much harm to values like judicial economy. 
Switching from the normative to the positive, Part IV attempts to 
explain how courts could have fallen into the error of perpetuating the 
one-plaintiff rule. The explanation assigns responsibility to the 
material incentives of courts and government litigants and to certain 
aspects of contemporary legal culture. The legal-cultural factors 
include background assumptions about judicial supremacy and the 
tendency, now manifesting itself even in lower courts, to elevate the 
judiciary’s law-declaration function over its dispute-resolution 
function. The same legal-cultural trends may explain problematic 
developments in adjacent doctrinal spaces, such as the growing 
willingness of district courts to issue nationwide injunctions that bar 
the government from enforcing a law against any person, including 
non-parties.16 
 
 16. See generally Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 
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I.  THE ONE-PLAINTIFF RULE AND ITS ORIGINS 
This Part provides some background on the one-plaintiff rule. It 
begins by describing the rule, how it operates, and its pervasive role in 
the federal courts today. It also discusses limitations on the rule’s use, 
particularly with respect to the nature of the relief at stake. Finally, this 
Part explores the rule’s genesis, which might best be described as 
unintentional. 
A. The Rule, Its Operation, and Some Examples 
Standing is required in every federal case. In a single-plaintiff case, 
that means the plaintiff is required to have standing, and the case will 
be dismissed if the plaintiff lacks it. In a multiple-plaintiff case, a suit 
may proceed at least with respect to the plaintiff(s) with standing. 
According to the one-plaintiff rule, a court need not consider the 
standing of other plaintiffs once one plaintiff is determined to have 
standing. Further, the rule permits a court to proceed to adjudicate the 
merits of the entire case, as to all plaintiffs, as long as one of them has 
standing. That is the rule the courts have developed, and that is the rule 
this Article rejects. 
Once one becomes aware of its existence, one finds the one-
plaintiff rule everywhere. The Supreme Court has invoked some 
version of the one-plaintiff rule more than two dozen times in the last 
several decades.17 In all but one of those cases, the Court had before it 
both standing issues and merits issues.18 The one-plaintiff rule allowed 
the Court to proceed to the merits after identifying one proper 
plaintiff, rather than addressing the standing of all plaintiffs and then 
resolving the merits only for the plaintiff(s) found to have standing. To 
be sure, there are cases in which the Court, without mentioning the 
one-plaintiff rule one way or the other, performs distinct standing 
inquiries for multiple plaintiffs. This is particularly true in cases that 
 
131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (observing this development and criticizing it on historical 
and judicial-structural grounds). 
 17. The Appendix provides a list of the cases in which the Supreme Court used the one-
plaintiff rule, along with some additional information on the cases. I included those cases in which, 
once the Court determined that one plaintiff had standing, the Court stated that it or the lower 
court need not consider the standing of other plaintiffs. The earliest Supreme Court case I 
identified is from 1964, but the rule did not begin to appear with any regularity until the mid-
1970s. 
 18. The exception was Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1648 (2017), 
which is discussed further in Part I.B.2. 
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only address justiciability and not the merits.19 There are also multiple-
plaintiff cases in which the plaintiffs are identically situated for 
standing purposes, so that they are most naturally analyzed as a 
collective.20 But, to generalize, applying the one-plaintiff rule has 
become the Court’s usual practice in cases in which different plaintiffs 
present distinct standing issues. The Court has never directly criticized 
the rule. The one-plaintiff rule has become so routine that it is assumed 
on all sides.21 
As with most rules of federal jurisdiction and procedure, the lower 
courts have far more occasion to use the one-plaintiff rule than does 
the Supreme Court. They have called the rule an “abundantly clear,” 
“well-established,” “general rule” of federal practice.22 It is regularly 
used by federal courts across the country, typically (though not 
exclusively) in cases involving nonmonetary relief.23 
 
 19. E.g., Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2343–47 (2014); Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181–83 (2000); Gladstone Realtors 
v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109–115 (1979). There was a dissent in Friends of the Earth, so 
the Court’s discussion of multiple plaintiffs’ standing might have been an attempt to bolster the 
evidentiary basis for the standing ruling, in case the Court’s ruling was not persuasive as to a 
particular plaintiff.  
 20. E.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 272–74 (2008); FEC 
v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 22–24 (1998). 
 21. See, e.g., supra note 13 (quoting comments from both advocates and the Court during the 
King v. Burwell oral argument). 
 22. Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 
(11th Cir. 2011) (“The law is abundantly clear that so long as at least one plaintiff has standing to 
raise each claim . . . we need not address whether the remaining plaintiffs have standing.”), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); Leonard 
v. Clark, 12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The general rule applicable to federal court suits with 
multiple plaintiffs is that once the court determines that one of the plaintiffs has standing, it need 
not decide the standing of the others.”); Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88, 92–93 (D.D.C. 
2013), aff’d, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“It is well-established that a court need not consider 
the standing of the other plaintiffs when at least one plaintiff has standing.”). 
 23. At least twelve of the thirteen courts of appeals have used the one-plaintiff rule. E.g., 
Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 801 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2015); Tierney v. Advocate Health & 
Hosps. Corp., 797 F.3d 449, 451 (7th Cir. 2015); McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 
F.3d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 2014); Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 316 n.7 (4th Cir. 
2013); Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist., 713 F.3d 25, 29 (10th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of 
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 84 n.2 (2d Cir. 2012); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 182–83 
(3d Cir. 2010); ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1195 (11th Cir. 
2009); Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Leonard v. Clark, 
12 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1993); Wash. Legal Found. v. Mass. Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962, 972 (1st 
Cir. 1993); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Agric. Stabilization & Conservation Serv., 955 F.2d 1199, 1203 
(8th Cir. 1992). I have not identified a relevant case from the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. The courts listed above have not invariably followed the rule; for some instances in which 
lower courts required all plaintiffs to show standing, see notes 47–51 and accompanying text. For 
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Contrary to what one might suppose, the courts’ use of the one-
plaintiff rule is not limited to cases in which the plaintiffs are about to 
lose on the merits anyway. In such cases, one might be tempted to 
adopt a “no harm, no foul” attitude. But the plaintiffs prevailed on the 
merits in more than half of the Supreme Court cases applying the rule.24 
In the lower courts too, parties who benefited from the rule sometimes 
win on the merits and sometimes lose. There are too many lower court 
cases to provide a precise breakdown of the proportions, but both 
outcomes occur with some frequency. 
Cases applying the one-plaintiff rule often state that, once one 
proper plaintiff has been found, they “need not consider” or “need not 
address” whether other plaintiffs have standing.25 This language makes 
it sound as though the court is remaining agnostic on the standing of 
the other plaintiffs, not ruling on standing one way or the other. But 
such agnosticism is not possible, at least not for long. A plaintiff either 
remains in the case or not. When courts apply the one-plaintiff rule, 
the other plaintiffs remain in the case, and not only as an interim 
measure while, for example, complicated jurisdictional facts are sorted 
out. Rather, the other plaintiffs remain in the case as full-fledged 
parties, which, depending on the case, might go so far as trial and 
judgment on the merits or appeal and remand for further proceedings 
on the merits.26 At least as a functional matter, and as the courts 
themselves sometimes put it, courts employing the one-plaintiff rule 
assume that all plaintiffs have standing and adjudicate the merits based 
on that assumption.27 
Courts easily slide from the erroneous proposition that the 
standing of certain plaintiffs need not be considered to the even worse 
act of proceeding as if all plaintiffs in fact have standing. Consider the 
 
the relevance of the form of relief being sought and examples of cases involving damages, see 
infra Part I.B.1.  
 24. See infra Appendix. 
 25. E.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431 n.19 (1998) (“Because both the City 
of New York and the health care [plaintiffs-]appellees have standing, we need not consider 
whether the [plaintiff-]appellee unions also have standing to sue.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Ouachita Watch League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163, 1170 (11th Cir. 2006) (“So 
long as one party has standing, other parties may remain in the suit without a standing injury.” 
(emphasis added)). On remand, the district court described the Eleventh Circuit’s decision as 
having resolved issues of standing “in Plaintiffs’ favor,” and the district court then proceeded to 
the merits. Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1273 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (emphasis 
added). 
 27. E.g., Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 44–45 (1974) (stating that “we assume 
without deciding that [one plaintiff] does have standing” where another plaintiff did). 
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Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Texas v. United States,28 the case brought by 
Texas and twenty-five other states to block the Obama 
administration’s “deferred action” immigration program. The Fifth 
Circuit determined that one plaintiff state, Texas, had standing on the 
theory that it expended funds to issue driver’s licenses to beneficiaries 
of deferred action.29 Citing the one-plaintiff rule, the court deemed 
Texas’s standing sufficient to proceed to the merits of the case as a 
whole.30 But the last sentence of the court’s Article III standing 
discussion stated that “[t]he states have standing,”31 as if all of them did, 
which is a conclusion that was never justified or even examined. Other 
courts occasionally slip up in much the same way.32 
The effects of the one-plaintiff rule are heightened by the fact that 
the rule is not limited to cases in which one could safely assume that all 
plaintiffs would be found to have standing if only the court bothered to 
conduct the analysis. Massachusetts v. EPA33 provides a good example 
of a case in which the standing of the additional plaintiffs was 
questionable. In that case, a dozen states, along with several other 
government entities and a collection of environmental groups, filed suit 
to challenge the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) decision 
declining to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions.34 Before addressing 
the questions on the merits—which concerned the EPA’s authority 
under the Clean Air Act—the Supreme Court addressed what it 
described as “serious” questions about whether the challenge 
presented an Article III case or controversy.35 The Court did not 
discuss whether all of the challengers had standing, but instead stated, 
 
 28. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 
S. Ct. 2271 (2016).  
 29. Id. at 150.  
 30. Id. at 151. 
 31. Id. at 162 (emphasis added). 
 32. E.g., Pelphrey v. Cobb Cty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2008) (writing in a section 
heading that “the taxpayers” have standing even though the court used the one-plaintiff rule to 
limit its analysis to one taxpayer plaintiff); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. 
Cheney, 593 F. Supp. 2d 194, 226 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The Court finds that [one plaintiff] has 
established standing to advance Plaintiffs’ claims.” (emphasis added)). For another example, see 
supra note 26. 
 33. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 34. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). In this 
particular case, the challengers had filed a petition for review of agency action, so they were 
“petitioners” rather than “plaintiffs,” but that distinction makes no relevant difference for Article 
III standing purposes. 
 35. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 506. 
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in accordance with the one-plaintiff rule, that only one of them needed 
standing.36 The one and only party whose standing the Court addressed 
was Massachusetts, and the standing-conferring injury that the Court 
relied upon was the inundation, brought about by rising sea levels, of 
the state’s own coastal property.37 After discussing how Massachusetts 
satisfied the standing requirements, the Court then concluded its 
standing analysis by writing that “petitioners”—apparently all of them 
now, as a group—had standing to challenge the EPA’s denial of their 
rulemaking petition.38 Turning to the merits, the Court upheld the 
challengers’ objections to the EPA’s decision and required the agency 
to revisit the matter.39 
It is by no means clear that the other challengers in Massachusetts 
v. EPA would have been found to have standing had the Court 
inquired. The loss of coastal landholdings could not support standing 
for all of the petitioners, not even for all of the states, as some of them 
were not coastal. And the standing of the environmental groups was 
even less certain. The Court’s opinion stated that Massachusetts, as a 
state protecting its “quasi-sovereign interests,” was “entitled to special 
solicitude in our standing analysis.”40 The opinion therefore provides 
some reason to question whether the environmental groups, without 
such special solicitude, could have established standing if they had been 
required to do so. 
The standing of certain plaintiffs was likewise questionable in 
Bowsher v. Synar.41 In that case, the Supreme Court invoked the one-
plaintiff rule to bypass the question whether members of Congress had 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act. The Court did so on the ground that 
another plaintiff, a government worker who lost out on a raise because 
of the Act, did have standing.42 Given that the legislators’ interest was 
more institutional than personal, it was highly doubtful that they had 
standing.43 One could provide many more examples of cases in which 
 
 36. Id. at 518.  
 37. Id. at 522. 
 38. Id. at 526. 
 39. Id. at 534. 
 40. Id. at 520. 
 41. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 42. Id. at 721. 
 43. Probably they did not have standing, at least not according to the approach the Court 
used when it did directly address legislator standing in a later case. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 
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the standing of some plaintiffs was questionable at best.44 
Courts do not treat the one-plaintiff rule as mandatory. That is, I 
have not encountered any case outright forbidding an inquiry into 
other plaintiffs’ standing upon finding one proper plaintiff. There are 
some decisions that mention the one-plaintiff rule, expressly describe 
it as a discretionary option, and then proceed to analyze standing for 
every plaintiff and dismiss plaintiffs who lack standing.45 Yet, if a court 
does not have to consider the standing of other plaintiffs but does so 
anyway, then its discussion of those extra plaintiffs’ standing is not 
strictly necessary and, in that sense, is arguably mere dictum. In a few 
cases, courts have indeed taken that position, deeming a previous 
court’s holding on the standing of an additional plaintiff to be 
nonbinding because it was unnecessary.46 
 
811, 829–30 (1997) (holding that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act). See generally Nat Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of 
Congressional Standing, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (2015) (noting that the Court has repeatedly declined 
opportunities to recognize legislator standing without definitively foreclosing it).  
 44. See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing standing in King v. Burwell). 
 45. E.g., Thiebaut v. Colo. Springs Utils., 455 F. App’x 795, 802 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[N]othing 
in the cases addressing this [one-plaintiff] principle suggests that a court must permit a plaintiff 
that lacks standing to remain in a case whenever it determines that a co-plaintiff has standing. 
Instead, courts retain discretion to analyze the standing of all plaintiffs in a case and to dismiss 
those plaintiffs that lack standing.”); We Are Am./Somos Am., Coal. of Ariz. v. Maricopa Cty. 
Bd. of Supervisors, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1091 (D. Ariz. 2011) (“[The one-plaintiff] rule does not 
strictly prohibit a district court, in a multiple plaintiff case such as this, from considering the 
standing of the other plaintiffs even if it finds that one plaintiff has standing.”); see also Florida ex 
rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1148 (N.D. Fla. 
2010) (invoking one-plaintiff rule and finding that some plaintiffs have standing but then “for the 
sake of completeness” addressing standing of remaining plaintiff and concluding that it also had 
standing), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part sub nom. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 46. In Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 
459 U.S. 297 (1983), there was a question regarding the standing of the Director of the Office of 
Workers’ Compensation Programs to seek review of an adverse employee-benefits decision. Id. 
at 302. The Court treated the question of the Director’s standing to appeal as open and further 
held that it need not resolve the question because the injured employee was also a party to the 
proceedings. Id. at 302–05. The Court acknowledged a few previous instances in which it had 
granted petitions filed by the Director, but the Court did not regard those cases as settling the 
matter of standing. Regarding one of those prior cases, the Court stated that “[i]t was not 
necessary to consider the issue of the Director’s standing in [the prior case] because a justiciable 
controversy was before the Court by virtue of the petition of the employer and insurer.” Perini 
N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. at 303 n.11. In other words, the Court treated the prior case as if it had 
silently applied the one-plaintiff rule even though that case did not discuss standing at all. 
Another example of treating a standing ruling as unnecessary dictum comes from the 
unusual case of Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2004). A prior Ninth Circuit 
panel entertaining an environmental case had held that environmentalists and a bird had standing 
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Although the lower courts have largely embraced the one-plaintiff 
rule, there are a few lower-court cases that depart from it. As one 
decision from the Sixth Circuit put it, “Our determination of standing 
is both plaintiff- and provision-specific. That one plaintiff has standing 
to assert a particular claim does not mean that all of them do.”47 In that 
particular case, several plaintiffs challenged two different provisions of 
a state law, and the court separately analyzed whether each plaintiff 
had standing to challenge each provision, finding that only two of the 
plaintiffs had standing and that they had it only for one of the 
challenged provisions.48 Other Sixth Circuit cases, however, follow the 
one-plaintiff rule without apparent realization of any conflict.49 The 
confusion extends to the Sixth Circuit district courts: some of them cite 
the one-plaintiff rule, but one district court within the circuit, in a 
rather stunning decision, sanctioned an attorney partly because of his 
repeated contentions that only one of his plaintiffs needed standing.50 
Still, such examples aside, most courts treat the one-plaintiff rule as a 
given—so much so that one decision by the D.C. Circuit reduced an 
award of attorneys’ fees because the attorneys gathered standing 
affidavits from multiple plaintiffs when, according to the court, only 
one plaintiff’s standing had to be shown.51 Part of the value of this 
Article is to make the one-plaintiff rule more salient to courts and 
litigants, which should prevent such inconsistencies. 
 
to sue. The subsequent panel treated the standing ruling as to the bird as unnecessary dictum in 
light of the one-plaintiff rule. Id. at 1173–74. Although courts these days often give binding effect 
to statements in prior cases without regard to traditional distinctions between holding and dictum, 
in this case there was a strong reason for the later panel to try to avoid following the earlier ruling. 
 47. Fednav, Ltd. v. Chester, 547 F.3d 607, 614 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Pagan v. Calderon, 
448 F.3d 16, 26 (1st Cir. 2006) (“The standing inquiry is both plaintiff-specific and claim-specific. 
Thus, a reviewing court must determine whether each particular plaintiff is entitled to have a 
federal court adjudicate each particular claim that he asserts.”). Pagan was a damages case, which 
may explain why it did not use the one-plaintiff rule, though the decision did not indicate that the 
nature of the relief mattered. Both of these decisions cited language in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), as rejecting the one-plaintiff rule, but I do not 
think Allen can be so read. See infra note 239.  
 48. Fednav, 547 F.3d at 614–15, 618. 
 49. E.g., Parsons v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 801 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2015); Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t 
of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (plurality opinion of Cole, J.).   
 50. Liberty Legal Found. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 12-2143-STA, 2012 WL 6026496, 
at *2–3 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 4, 2012), aff’d, 575 F. App’x 662 (6th Cir. 2014). The lawsuit contended 
that President Barack Obama was ineligible to serve as president, so there were other frivolous 
arguments too. For a district court in the Sixth Circuit applying the one-plaintiff rule, see Poe v. 
Snyder, 834 F. Supp. 2d 721, 732 (W.D. Mich. 2011). 
 51. New Jersey v. EPA, 703 F.3d 110, 115–16 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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More common than express statements that all plaintiffs must 
have standing are cases in which courts separately analyze the standing 
of all plaintiffs in a case without mentioning the one-plaintiff rule one 
way or the other.52 Perhaps this is because the judges know the rule is 
discretionary and have chosen to analyze the standing of each plaintiff, 
albeit without explaining their reasoning. More likely the judges just 
did not think about what they were doing, perhaps because the parties 
failed to address the one-plaintiff rule in their briefs. Again, part of the 
goal is to bring the one-plaintiff rule, which often hides in plain sight, 
out into the light where it can be seen and scrutinized. 
The discussion so far has concerned Article III standing, but 
versions of the one-plaintiff rule apply in other contexts too. For 
example, courts have applied the same rule with regard to multiple-
plaintiff cases involving other justiciability doctrines. With regard to 
mootness, courts have said that they need not decide whether the 
claims of some plaintiffs have become moot as long as one plaintiff 
retains a live claim.53 So too with ripeness54 and prudential standing.55 
B. Some Elaborations and Exceptions 
A few more details are necessary to complete the picture of the 
one-plaintiff rule in operation. Courts apply the one-plaintiff rule in a 
variety of contexts, without regard to the particular procedural 
mechanism by which a case came to have multiple plaintiffs. Yet courts 
have recognized some restrictions on the rule’s use, in particular by 
limiting it to cases in which all of the plaintiffs pursue similar claims 
and relief. 
 
 52. See supra note 19 (citing examples from the Supreme Court). 
 53. E.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 n.1 (2005) (stating that “we do not reach the 
question whether the claims of [plaintiffs] Cutter and Gerhardt continue to present an actual 
controversy” because other plaintiffs’ claims were not moot); see also 13B CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3533.1, at 733 (3d ed. 2008) (“[A]s with standing, where it suffices to find one plaintiff with 
standing, a live action remains despite mooting as to some parties so long as there is a non-moot 
dispute between at least one plaintiff and one defendant.”). 
 54. E.g., Allandale Neighborhood Ass’n v. Austin Transp. Study Policy Advisory Comm., 
840 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1988) (declining to reach constitutional ripeness issues of other 
plaintiffs where at least two plaintiffs’ claims were constitutionally ripe). 
 55. E.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In 
Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984), it appears that the Court bypassed a 
question of prudential “zone of interests” standing as opposed to Article III standing, but the 
opinion is not clear on this point. Id. at 319 n.3. For a discussion of whether courts may permissibly 
bypass prudential standing, see infra Part III.E.5.  
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1. Application to Various Procedural Contexts.  There are a few 
different procedural routes through which a case may come to have 
multiple plaintiffs or, more generally, multiple parties invoking federal 
jurisdiction. For the most part, the courts have not distinguished 
between these different contexts when applying the one-plaintiff rule.  
At the district court level, several joinder rules can generate 
multiple plaintiffs. The basic joinder rule, and the rule that provides 
the most occasions for use of the one-plaintiff rule, is Rule 20, which 
permits plaintiffs asserting related claims to join together in one case.56 
Some decisions invoking the one-plaintiff rule arise from separate 
cases that were consolidated under Rule 42.57 One might suppose that 
courts would be reluctant to use the one-plaintiff rule when handling a 
consolidated case that began as two separate cases, one of which lacked 
a plaintiff with standing, but in fact the courts seem perfectly willing to 
employ the one-plaintiff rule in such situations.58 The rule is also used 
in the context of intervention under Rule 24, where courts have held 
that an intervenor-plaintiff does not need standing as long as another 
party aligned with the intervenor has it.59 
In another variation on the theme, a similar rule has been applied 
in the context of standing to appeal an adverse judgment, although 
here the authorities are fewer. In Horne v. Flores, parents and students 
prevailed in a lawsuit charging the state of Arizona with breaching its 
duties to provide proper support to students learning English.60 Years 
later, the defendant superintendent of education, along with state 
 
 56. FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1). 
 57. FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (permitting the district court to consolidate cases or take other 
measures to effectively manage cases sharing common questions of law or fact). 
 58. E.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719–21 (1986); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of 
Atlanta Area, Inc. v. Miller, 934 F.2d 1462, 1465–67 nn.2–3 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Steinman, 
supra note 15, at 728 n.31 (citing examples of consolidated cases in which courts employed the 
one-plaintiff rule). 
 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 24. The Supreme Court’s most recent encounter with the one-plaintiff 
rule involved an intervenor-plaintiff, but the Court did not find the intervention context to hold 
any particular significance. See Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 
(2017); infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the case). Before Town of Chester, the majority of the courts 
of appeals already applied the one-plaintiff rule in intervention contexts, though some had not. 
See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 51 n.65 (3d ed. 2008) (citing majority and minority 
positions); see also David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, 
and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 726–27 (1968) (arguing that intervenors should not have 
to satisfy the justiciability tests applied to original plaintiffs). 
 60. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009). 
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legislators who had recently intervened in the case, moved for relief 
from the district court’s continuing injunction on the basis of changed 
circumstances. The district court denied their motion for relief from 
the judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed.61 The superintendent 
and the legislators then petitioned for certiorari. The Supreme Court 
began by addressing the petitioners’ standing to seek review and ruled 
that the superintendent—a defendant against whom the judgment 
ran—had standing.62 The Court then stated that “[b]ecause the 
superintendent clearly has standing to challenge the lower courts’ 
decisions, we need not consider whether the Legislators also have 
standing to do so.”63 The Court’s decision to bypass consideration of 
the legislators’ standing is particularly noteworthy because the 
legislators and the superintendent had filed separate petitions for 
certiorari by separate counsel, though the Court consolidated the 
cases.64 The Court ultimately ruled in the petitioners’ favor on the 
merits and ordered the lower court to conduct a new inquiry into 
whether to grant relief from the judgment.65 
In contrast to the easy acceptance the one-plaintiff rule has won 
in most contexts, it has been met with some resistance in the context of 
class action suits that seek damages. It is not surprising that the one-
plaintiff rule engenders more opposition when plaintiffs seek huge 
damages from a private party than when they seek declaratory or 
injunctive relief from a government entity that ordinarily tries to treat 
similarly situated persons equally. The defendant facing a plausibly 
meritorious claim for damages has a strong incentive to raise whatever 
arguments might prevent certification or at least narrow the 
membership of the class. 
The question that has generated controversy in the class-action 
 
 61. Id. at 443–44. 
 62. Id. at 445–46. 
 63. Id. at 446; see also Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Program v. Perini N. River Assocs., 
459 U.S. 297, 302–05 (1983) (holding that it was unnecessary to decide whether a government 
official had Article III standing to seek appellate review where an injured individual was also a 
party before the Court); cf. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986) (stating that a party found 
to lack standing to appeal could “ride ‘piggyback’” on another party’s standing, if that other party 
had appealed). 
 64. See Horne v. Flores, 555 U.S. 1092 (2009) (mem.) (granting certiorari and consolidating 
cases).  
 65. Horne, 557 U.S. at 472. The district court ultimately vacated its previous injunction 
against the state, and the court of appeals affirmed. Flores v. Huppenthal, 789 F.3d 994, 1101 (9th 
Cir. 2015). 
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context is generally phrased as whether all the members of a class must 
have Article III standing.66 Some courts, probably the majority, appear 
to hold that the one-plaintiff rule applies in class actions, so that only 
the representative party, but not all the class members, need have 
Article III standing.67 Other courts appear to hold the opposite, stating 
that all plaintiffs, including all the members of the class, must have 
Article III standing.68 As explained below, the class action context 
differs in meaningful ways from other situations in which the one-
plaintiff rule arises, and many of the cases that purport to concern the 
standing of class members do not truly involve Article III standing.69 
2. Limitations Based on the Remedies at Stake.  Courts sometimes 
limit the use of the one-plaintiff rule according to the type of relief 
requested in the case. The restrictions have been expressed in two 
different, though partly overlapping, ways. 
First, some courts and commentators have distinguished between 
injunctive and declaratory relief on the one hand and monetary relief 
on the other, restricting the one-plaintiff rule to the former.70 
 
 66. E.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at i, Ticketmaster v. Stearns, 132 S. Ct. 1970 (2012) 
(No. 11-983), 2012 WL 441276; Theane Evangelis & Bradley J. Hamburger, Article III Standing 
and Absent Class Members, 64 EMORY L.J. 383, 385, 387, 392 (2014). 
 67. E.g., Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 362 (3d Cir. 2015); Kohen v. 
Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2009); Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 
974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). When there are multiple class representatives, the usual one-
plaintiff rule appears to operate among them, so that only one needs standing. E.g., Colo. Cross-
Disability Coal. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 765 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2014); see 1 WILLIAM 
B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:8 (5th ed. 2011). 
 68. E.g., Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 1023, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010); Denney v. 
Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264 (2d Cir. 2006); see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 732 F.3d 
326, 340–44 (5th Cir. 2013) (opinion of Clement, J.) (adopting this approach in a portion of the 
opinion that was not joined by the other members of the panel). I refer to what the courts 
“appear” to hold because it is unclear what these courts really mean and how much difference 
there is between the supposedly conflicting positions. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 67, § 2:3 
(summarizing the cases and reconciling some of the apparently conflicting statements). 
 69. See infra Part III.E.4. 
 70. E.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Optometrists & Opticians Lenscrafters, Inc. v. Brown, 567 F.3d 521, 
523 (9th Cir. 2009) (“As a general rule, in an injunctive case this court need not address standing 
of each plaintiff if it concludes that one plaintiff has standing.”); Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. 
Supp. 421, 437 (W.D. Mo. 1978) (“In an action for monetary damages, each and every plaintiff 
must have standing to reap the benefits of judgment against the defendant. In an equity 
proceeding seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, such as the instant litigation, it is customary 
for courts to cease their inquiry once a proper plaintiff has been identified which satisfies the ‘case 
or controversy’ requirements.”); 15 JAMES WM. MOORE & MARTIN H. REDISH, MOORE’S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.23 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017) (“Only one plaintiff 
must have standing to assert a claim. Therefore, once a court determines the existence of one 
BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017  11:16 AM 
498  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:481 
Moreover, even when courts do not expressly state such a remedy-
based limitation, the cases in which the one-plaintiff rule is invoked are 
usually cases involving injunctive or declaratory relief, such as cases 
that seek to enjoin an allegedly illegal government policy or action.71 
Although this Article argues that the one-plaintiff rule is incorrect 
regardless of the remedy sought, it is certainly understandable that 
courts would draw this remedy-based distinction. Any error in granting 
generalized nonmonetary relief is harder to see than the error in 
putting money into the pocket of a plaintiff whose standing was only 
assumed.  
Still, courts have not always drawn this money-versus-injunction 
distinction. Courts have sometimes required individualized standing 
inquiries in injunctive cases that would require the defendant to take 
different actions for each plaintiff.72 And courts occasionally apply the 
one-plaintiff rule even in cases involving claims for damages.73 Of 
particular note here are damages class actions, where, as discussed 
above, debates over the standing of class members sometimes 
implicate the one-plaintiff rule.74 
A second, and slightly more subtle, way of expressing a remedy-
based limitation on the one-plaintiff rule is to say that the rule applies 
when all plaintiffs seek the same relief but not when they seek different 
relief. That is how the Supreme Court described the rule in its recent 
 
plaintiff with standing, at least when generalized equitable relief is sought, it need not consider 
whether other plaintiffs also have standing to assert that claim. Of course, in order to qualify for 
the award of damages each plaintiff must establish injury.”); see also Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. 
of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109–15 (1979) (treating two groups of plaintiffs separately for standing 
purposes in a case that potentially involved damages, without mentioning the one-plaintiff rule). 
 71. E.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 431 n.19 (1998) (applying the one-
plaintiff rule in suit seeking declaratory relief holding Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional). 
 72. E.g., Wikimedia Found. v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 857 F.3d 193, 216–17 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(conducting separate standing inquires where plaintiffs sought to have agency purge records of 
their particular communications). But see id. at 218 n.1 (Davis, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (criticizing the majority for engaging in an unnecessary plaintiff-by-plaintiff standing 
inquiry). 
 73. See, e.g., Hardaway v. D.C. Hous. Auth., 843 F.3d 973, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (reinstating 
a case seeking damages and injunctive relief where one plaintiff had standing); Laroe Estates, Inc. 
v. Town of Chester, 828 F.3d 60, 65–66 (2d Cir. 2016) (applying one-plaintiff rule to an intervenor 
in a case seeking damages), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017) (vacating and remanding for the court 
of appeals to determine whether the additional plaintiff sought different damages than the 
original plaintiff); see also infra notes 130–34 (describing cases awarding attorneys’ fees and costs 
to parties who have not demonstrated standing). 
 74. See infra Part I.B.1. 
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decision in Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates,75 which ruled that an 
additional plaintiff whose standing is uncertain “must have Article III 
standing in order to pursue relief that is different from that which is 
sought by a party with standing.”76 The Court did not attempt to 
explain what exactly that means, though presumably the Court’s “same 
relief” test would be satisfied at least in cases seeking “generalized” 
relief, such as an injunction that bars enforcement of an 
unconstitutional statute. But Town of Chester itself was a damages 
case, and it is hard to know how the same-relief test applies in that 
context. Is an award of damages the “same relief” when a second 
plaintiff seeks to share in the judgment without changing the total 
amount sought from the defendant? Or is it the “same relief” only 
when the additional plaintiff seeks no money judgment in his or her 
own name? That was the awkward position that the additional plaintiff 
in Town of Chester eventually conceded itself into.77 Questions about 
the application of the test remain unanswered, because the Court did 
not apply its own test but instead remanded for the court of appeals to 
figure out what exactly the additional plaintiff still wanted.78 
It is not yet time to present the argument against the one-plaintiff 
rule, but the Court’s recent embrace of this remedy-based test warrants 
a brief preview. As Part III will more fully explain, the one-plaintiff 
rule is incorrect whatever relief is at issue and whether or not different 
plaintiffs seek the same or different relief. Town of Chester’s central 
error is to forget that judgments are person-specific. That means, 
contrary to Town of Chester, that relief to different people is always 
different relief.79 
3. Limitation to Common Claims.  Courts sometimes qualify their 
use of the one-plaintiff rule by stating that the rule applies only when 
multiple plaintiffs raise the same issues, advance the same claim, or 
challenge the same law.80 And, in practice, courts tend to limit its use 
 
 75. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017). 
 76. Id. at 1651. The additional plaintiff in this case was a Rule 24 intervenor-plaintiff rather 
than a Rule 20 co-plaintiff, but the Court viewed that as immaterial. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1652 n.4 (noting the intervenor’s assertion that it sought only to “maximize [the 
original plaintiff’s] recovery”). 
 78. Id. at 1651–52. 
 79. See infra Part III.A. 
 80. E.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 402 (1982) 
(“Petitioners have not challenged the standing of the other plaintiffs and, therefore, even if 
Pennsylvania lacks standing, the District Court possessed Art. III jurisdiction to entertain those 
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to such scenarios, at least when they are being careful. For example, 
imagine a case that involves challenges to two related laws or policies—
Provision 1 and Provision 2—with three plaintiffs—A, B, and C. 
Plaintiff A challenges only Provision 1, and the other two plaintiffs 
challenge only Provision 2. In such a circumstance, the court would 
probably feel compelled to determine whether Plaintiff A has standing 
to challenge Provision 1 and whether at least one of the other plaintiffs 
has standing to challenge Provision 2. If Plaintiff B is found to have 
standing to challenge Provision 2, then the court would feel free to 
dispense with considering the standing of Plaintiff C to challenge that 
same provision. That is, the courts generally require one good plaintiff 
per issue or claim. 
The Supreme Court conducted such a fine-grained standing 
inquiry in Lewis v. Casey,81 which involved multiple plaintiffs 
presenting different issues. Lewis concerned the propriety of an 
injunction ordering Arizona to improve law libraries throughout its 
prison system and to protect inmates’ access to the courts, especially 
for inmates who were illiterate, did not speak English, or were held in 
lockdown.82 The plaintiffs were a group of twenty-two prisoners who 
sued as representatives of a class composed of all Arizona prisoners.83 
But only two prisoners, both of whom were illiterate or nearly so, had 
been found by the district court to have suffered adverse 
consequences—such as dismissal of a case—due to inadequate legal 
resources.84 
There was broad agreement on the Court that the district court’s 
injunction was too intrusive and failed to give adequate consideration 
to the state’s legitimate penological interests.85 The Court split, 
however, over the degree to which the district court’s errors should be 
 
common issues presented by all plaintiffs.”); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 
1228, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“For each claim, if constitutional and prudential standing can be 
shown for at least one plaintiff, we need not consider the standing of the other plaintiffs to raise 
that claim.”); see also Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 44–45, 67–70 (1974) (employing 
one-plaintiff rule in a section of the opinion where the same issues were presented by the 
additional plaintiff but not in a later section of the opinion where the plaintiffs presented different 
issues). 
 81. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996). 
 82. Id. at 346–47. 
 83. Id. at 346. 
 84. Id. at 358–59. 
 85. See id. at 409 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that the district court’s 
remedy was “broader than necessary”). 
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described as transgressions of Article III as opposed (merely) to an 
abuse of its equitable discretion in fashioning relief.86 Both Justice 
Souter’s concurrence and Justice Stevens’s dissent applied some 
version of the one-plaintiff rule, reasoning that the Court’s jurisdiction 
over the case was secure because at least the two illiterate plaintiffs had 
a cognizable injury under even the strictest understanding of what 
counts as a deprivation of access to the courts.87 The concurrence and 
the dissent thought the case could then be resolved on nonstanding 
grounds, such as improper definition of the class or the excessiveness 
of the remedial order. The majority, however, thought that standing 
had more work to do. In particular, the fact that an illiterate named 
plaintiff had suffered injury did not suffice to allow him to obtain relief 
for prisoners who suffered different types of deprivations, such as 
prisoners who did not speak English, those held in lockdown, or those 
in the general prison population.88 In response to the dissent’s 
argument that Article III standing requirements had been satisfied, the 
Court responded that “standing is not dispensed in gross.”89 
The Court’s exacting scrutiny of the different plaintiffs’ 
circumstances in Lewis was probably triggered by the fact that different 
prisoners were differently situated with respect to the deprivation of 
legal resources, such that the necessity of a granular approach to 
standing was especially apparent. One lesson we might draw from such 
cases is that the courts generally will not apply the one-plaintiff rule 
when doing so would obviously expand the scope of the case or of the 
proper relief. But courts generally do apply it when, as the courts see 
it, the case would proceed in the same way regardless of the plaintiffs 
involved. The courts’ mistake in drawing this distinction, as Parts II and 
III will explain, is that allowing plaintiffs to remain in a case without 
 
 86. See id. at 394 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the 
judgment) (suggesting that the Court would have been unanimous but for the majority’s decision 
to cast much of its ruling in terms of standing).  
 87. Id. (“[T]here is no apparent question that the standing of at least one of the class-action 
plaintiffs suffices for our jurisdiction . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 407–08 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[E]ven the majority finds on the record that at least two of the plaintiffs had standing 
in this case, which should be sufficient to satisfy any constitutional concerns.” (footnote omitted) 
(citation omitted) (citing id. at 356 (majority opinion))). 
 88. Id. at 357–58 (majority opinion). The Court further held that, given the limited evidence 
of violations, it was improper to provide system-wide relief addressing the obstacles faced by 
illiterate prisoners, though this last ruling was not based on Article III standing. Id. at 359–60, 360 
n.7. 
 89. Id. at 358 n.6. 
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standing is always wrong in principle and problematic in practice, even 
when all plaintiffs present similar claims on the merits. 
C. The Rule’s Origins 
It is difficult to identify the source of the one-plaintiff rule with 
confidence. There are some judgment calls involved in deciding 
whether a particular case is invoking the rule. Nonetheless, at the 
Supreme Court level, the rule dates back at least to a handful of cases 
from the 1960s and 1970s. Most of the early cases using the rule are 
well known today, though for their rulings on the merits rather than for 
their rulings on standing. The early development of the rule does not 
show that there was any well-articulated justification behind it or 
criteria for when it should be used. 
The first Supreme Court case to use the rule may have been 
Baggett v. Bullitt,90 in which plaintiffs challenged state laws that 
required state employees to take loyalty oaths.91 The district court 
upheld the requirement, but the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that 
the oaths—which required employees to swear that they were not 
“subversive persons”—were unconstitutionally vague.92 The primary 
plaintiffs in the case were university employees, but there were also a 
few students, whom the district court had dismissed for lack of 
standing.93 Of them, the Supreme Court wrote: 
Since the ground we find dispositive immediately affects the 
professors and other state employees required to take the oath, and 
the interests of the students at the University in academic freedom 
are fully protected by a judgment in favor of the teaching personnel, 
we have no occasion to pass on the standing of the students to bring 
this suit.94 
It is not clear where this left the students’ claims as a formal matter. 
The Court believed the students’ interests were protected as a practical 
matter by the judgment for the professors, so perhaps that means the 
Court saw no harm in leaving undisturbed the district court’s dismissal 
of the students. On this reading, the Court affirmed the district court’s 
apparently harmless dismissal. Yet the bottom line of the Court’s 
 
 90. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). 
 91. Id. at 366.  
 92. Id. at 361–66. 
 93. Transcript of Record at 44, Baggett, 377 U.S. 360 (No. 220). 
 94. Baggett, 377 U.S. at 366 n.5. 
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opinion says simply “reversed,” not “reversed in part and affirmed in 
part” or “dismissed in part.”95 So the better reading is probably that the 
Court believed it could simply leave the students’ standing in a state of 
limbo. As far as the briefs and oral argument reveal, the idea that the 
Court could bypass a ruling on the students’ standing was not suggested 
by the parties. The appellants’ brief had a short section arguing that the 
students did have standing, and it did not suggest that their standing 
was irrelevant or could be ignored.96 Although Baggett has been cited 
by a few later cases for the one-plaintiff rule,97 the opinion itself gives 
no sense that it was attempting to establish any general rule of 
procedure. 
Several of the other early cases applying the one-plaintiff rule 
were abortion cases, including Doe v. Bolton,98 the companion case to 
Roe v. Wade.99 Doe involved a challenge to the Georgia abortion 
statute brought by a pregnant woman, nine physicians, seven nurses, 
five clergymen, two social workers, and two nonprofits that advocated 
for abortion liberalization.100 The plaintiffs sought to represent classes 
of persons similarly situated.101 The district court had dismissed the 
claims of all plaintiffs but Doe, the pregnant woman, for lack of an 
immediate controversy.102 The Supreme Court began by holding that 
Doe had standing.103 “Inasmuch as Doe and her class are recognized 
[as proper plaintiffs],” the Court then observed, “the question whether 
the other appellants—physicians, nurses, clergymen, social workers, 
and corporations—present a justiciable controversy and have standing 
is perhaps a matter of no great consequence.”104 The Court nonetheless 
went on to hold, contrary to the district court, that the physicians too 
 
 95. Id. at 380.  
 96. Brief of Appellants at 215–17, Baggett, 377 U.S. 360 (No. 220). The oral argument does 
not reveal any discussion of standing. Oral Argument, Baggett, 377 U.S. 360 (No. 220), 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1963/220 [https://perma.cc/WCG2-GNHF].  
 97. E.g., Allandale Neighborhood Ass’n v. Austin Transp. Study Policy Advisory Comm., 
840 F.2d 258, 263 n.15 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 98. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).  
 99. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 100. Doe, 410 U.S. at 184. 
 101. Id. at 185–86. 
 102. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048, 1052–54 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff’d as modified, 410 U.S. 
179 (1973). The district court’s justiciability ruling relied primarily on Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 
(1961), which had refused to adjudicate a challenge to what the Court described as a moribund 
statute. Doe, 319 F. Supp. at 1053. 
 103. Doe, 410 U.S. at 187.  
 104. Id. at 188.  
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had standing. They were directly targeted by the abortion law, and the 
Court would not require them to violate the law and face prosecution 
in order to assert their rights.105 The Court then deemed it unnecessary 
to rule on the standing of any more parties: 
The parallel claims of the nurse, clergy, social worker, and 
corporation-appellants are another step removed and as to them, the 
Georgia statutes operate less directly. . . . We conclude that we need 
not pass upon the status of these additional appellants in this suit, for 
the issues are sufficiently and adequately presented by Doe and the 
physician-appellants, and nothing is gained or lost by the presence or 
absence of the nurses, the clergymen, the social workers, and the 
corporations.106 
The Court then turned to the merits. The district court had entered a 
declaratory judgment invalidating several aspects of the Georgia 
abortion statute but upholding other aspects.107 The Supreme Court 
modified the district court’s ruling by finding additional provisions 
unconstitutional.108 
The passage quoted above cited Roe v. Wade, but Roe did not 
invoke the one-plaintiff rule despite the opportunity to do so. In Roe, 
the Supreme Court determined that Jane Roe, a single woman 
pregnant at the time the suit was commenced, had standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of the Texas abortion statute.109 Also 
before the Court was a married couple, going by the pseudonyms John 
and Mary Doe, who, like Roe, sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
against the Texas statute.110 The Court wrote that “[i]n view of our 
ruling as to Roe’s standing in her case, the issue of the Does’ standing 
in their case has little significance.”111 The Court nonetheless went on 
to address their standing and to determine that they lacked standing, 
 
 105. Id. In deciding to address the standing of the physicians even after Doe had been found 
to have standing, the Court presumably thought that something was to be gained by doing so. 
Some of the arguments on the merits related to the physicians’ interests in particular, such as their 
interest in practicing their profession freely and without fear of vague criminal prohibitions. See 
id. at 191–93. 
 106. Id. at 189.  
 107. Id. at 186–87. 
 108. Id. at 201–02. 
 109. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124–25 (1973). 
 110. Id. at 127. 
 111. Id. 
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and the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling to that effect.112 This 
is the sort of situation in which the Court might have invoked the one-
plaintiff rule and probably would do so today. The Court’s decision not 
to use the one-plaintiff rule in Roe while using it in Doe does not seem 
to reflect any particular thinking—in fact, “decision” is probably too 
strong a word for it.113 It probably goes without saying, but the Court’s 
attention in Doe and Roe was not centrally focused on matters of 
standing. 
Other early Supreme Court cases invoking the one-plaintiff rule 
include the campaign finance landmark Buckley v. Valeo114 and the 
housing discrimination case Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.115 Both decisions invoked 
the one-plaintiff rule in a single sentence without providing a citation 
to authority supporting it.116 Arlington Heights has often been cited in 
later cases using the one-plaintiff rule and probably did more than any 
other early case to popularize the one-plaintiff rule. 
Although doctrinal innovations are generally assumed to spread 
from the top of the system down, it appears that the one-plaintiff rule 
was independently discovered in the lower courts. There are lower 
court cases from the 1960s and early 1970s that invoke the rule without 
citing any Supreme Court authority (and, indeed, there would have 
been little to cite at that point).117 Like the early Supreme Court cases, 
these cases do not reveal any sustained thought about why the one-
plaintiff rule is permissible. 
 
 112. Id. at 129. 
 113. The district court had consolidated the Does’ case with Roe’s case. Id. at 121. One might 
be tempted to believe that this explains why the Court felt it necessary to address the Does’ 
standing separately after finding that Roe had standing, but that is almost certainly not the 
explanation. First, the Court’s opinion in Roe did not say anything to suggest such reasoning. 
Second, it has become clear in the years since Roe that the distinction between one case filed by 
multiple plaintiffs (some of whom have doubtful standing) and consolidated cases (in which the 
plaintiff in one case has doubtful standing) does not make any difference to the Court when it 
comes to the one-plaintiff rule. See Steinman, supra note 15, at 728. For cases illustrating this 
point, see supra note 58. 
 114. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 115. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 116. Id. at 264 n.9; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12. 
 117. E.g., Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 894 n.2 (2d Cir. 1960); Ga. 
Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff’d sub nom. 
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Norton v. Ensor, 269 F. Supp. 533, 536 (D. Md. 1967); see 
also Alameda Conservation Ass’n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 1971) (showing 
disagreement between majority and dissent over whether standing of all plaintiffs had to be 
addressed). 
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II.  WHY THE ONE-PLAINTIFF RULE MATTERS 
Part III of this Article will demonstrate that the one-plaintiff rule 
is wrong. To motivate the normative argument, it is important to 
appreciate why it matters that courts get things right. It should go 
without saying that there is value in getting the law right just for the 
sake of getting things right. But in this instance there is more, as the 
one-plaintiff rule has bad consequences. Some of them are direct and 
concrete, such as improper awards of fees and costs and confusion over 
preclusive effect, which will be discussed in Section A. Other 
consequences, discussed in Section B, are more indirect, such as 
excessively broad injunctions and the stunted development of 
precedent. 
A. The Consequences of Incorrectly Granting Party Status 
To appreciate the bad effects of the one-plaintiff rule, it is helpful 
to remember two distinct functions of judicial decisions in our legal 
system: dispute resolution and law declaration.118 A court’s judgment 
resolves a dispute between the parties and thereby imposes certain 
rights and duties on those particular people. In addition, courts can 
issue opinions that establish, clarify, or otherwise declare the law that 
governs like cases.119 A party to a lawsuit is affected by the decision 
very differently than a nonparty. Everyone gets the decision’s 
precedential value—subject to the limitations of the rendering court’s 
reach and disputes over the meaning of the precedent—but only the 
parties get the judgment that definitively decides their rights and 
liabilities.120 
 
 118. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & 
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
73–75 (7th ed. 2015) (describing these two aspects of judicial decisionmaking). 
 119. Decisions can also resolve disputes without establishing law. Many decisions are not 
accompanied by reasoned opinions at all, many judicial opinions are formally without 
precedential effect, and so on.  
 120. See Stryker v. Crane, 123 U.S. 527, 539–40 (1887) (distinguishing between the force of a 
judgment and the lesser force of a precedent). The rise of nonmutual preclusion diminishes the 
significance of party status, but it does not nullify the distinction between parties and nonparties, 
even in public-law cases brought against the government. First, nonmutual preclusion is not 
automatic, particularly when asserted by plaintiffs, but is instead subject to the equities of the 
circumstances. Second, even when otherwise appropriate, nonmutual preclusion does not apply 
against at least some government defendants. See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158–
59 (1984) (holding that it does not apply against the federal government); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 10–18, Demaree v. Fulton Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 13-307, 2013 WL 4782249 (Sept. 5, 
2013) (showing circuit split regarding application of nonmutual preclusion against state and local 
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The magnitude of the practical difference between being subject 
to a judgment and being subject merely to precedent—that is, the 
difference party status makes—varies depending on what kind of court 
renders the decision. The gulf between parties and nonparties is widest 
in the district courts, where most litigation occurs. District court 
decisions are not binding precedent at all, not even within the district.121 
Public and private actors within the district might choose to follow the 
district court’s decision because they prophesy that a similar rule might 
be applied in future litigation, but they are not required to do so. The 
Supreme Court, by contrast, sets nationwide precedent. Because 
officials generally treat a Supreme Court holding as conclusive for all 
disputes within the holding’s scope, everyone is affected in 
approximately the same way as the parties.122 Indeed, the diminished 
stakes of party versus nonparty status at the Supreme Court level 
probably go a long way toward explaining how the misguided one-
plaintiff principle got its start. Nonetheless, no matter which court is at 
issue, party status still matters. The one-plaintiff rule’s central fault is 
that it elides the difference between parties and nonparties, thus 
incorrectly assigning the benefits and burdens of judgments to persons 
who should neither enjoy the benefits nor suffer the burdens. 
Concrete benefits and detriments accrue to parties alone. A 
winning plaintiff may enforce a judgment—perhaps, for example, by 
pursuing civil contempt against a recalcitrant defendant—but 
nonparties ordinarily may not.123 A judgment generally has preclusive 
effect only against parties: a losing party is estopped from relitigating 
the claims and issues resolved by the prior judgment, while a similarly 
 
governments). Third, preclusion might be denied when a party seeks to estop the government 
from relitigating a question of law (as opposed to fact). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 29 cmt. i, illus. 8 (1982). 
 121. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011). 
 122. Cf. Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto Class Actions: A Comment on 
the Implications of Cooper v. Aaron, 58 U. DET. J. URBAN L. 573, 574 (1981) (observing that 
“Supreme Court decisions, in constitutional cases at least, are de facto class actions”). 
 123. JOHN F. DOBBYN, INJUNCTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 223 (1974); cf. 12 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 3032, at 208–10 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing Rule 71, which allows certain nonparty beneficiaries 
to enforce judgments). In some instances, nonparties might intervene after judgment for purposes 
of enforcement, e.g., Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1565–66 (2d Cir. 1985), but such 
intervenors would need to have standing. See Moore v. Tangipahoa Par. Sch. Bd., 625 F.2d 33, 34 
(5th Cir. 1980) (clarifying that Rule 71 cannot be used by a nonparty “to enforce an order in an 
action in which [that person] has no standing to sue”). 
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situated nonparty is not so bound.124 A losing party may appeal a 
judgment, but nonparties ordinarily may not.125 
All of the foregoing propositions, which depend on the line 
between party and nonparty status, can be upended by the one-plaintiff 
rule. It licenses courts to give enforceable judgments to persons who 
lack standing and therefore should not be parties at all. Recall 
Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the Supreme Court found that 
Massachusetts had standing, employed the one-plaintiff rule to bypass 
consideration of other challengers’ more tenuous claims to standing, 
and remanded the case to the court of appeals for proceedings on the 
merits.126 On remand to the D.C. Circuit, all of the petitioners remained 
involved in the case on the same terms as Massachusetts without, so far 
as the record reveals, any inquiry into the standing of the other 
challengers. The D.C. Circuit remanded their petitions for review to 
the EPA for the agency to take regulatory action.127 After the EPA had 
not taken action for a year, the various petitioners asked the D.C. 
Circuit for a writ of mandamus ordering the agency to act. The majority 
denied the request, but it does not appear that the non-Massachusetts 
petitioners seeking enforcement—parties whose standing remained 
uncertain—were treated any differently in the enforcement 
proceedings than the one party found to have standing.128 
Further, the one-plaintiff rule sometimes leads courts to award 
monetary relief to parties whose standing was never established. With 
 
 124. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34 
(1982). Persons who are not parties to a case may be bound by the preclusive effects of the 
judgment in limited circumstances, such as where the nonparty was represented by a party or 
stands in a certain relationship, traditionally denominated “privity,” with a party. See Taylor v. 
Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 893–95 (2008).  
 125. See 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3902.1, at 102–32 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the general 
rule and its exceptions); Joan Steinman, Irregulars: The Appellate Rights of Persons Who Are Not 
Full-Fledged Parties, 39 GA. L. REV. 411, 484–517 (2005) (same). 
 126. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521, 535 (2007); supra text accompanying notes 33–
40. 
 127. Massachusetts. v. EPA, 249 F. App’x 829, 830 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (remanding the petitions 
for review in Nos. 03-1361, 03-1362, 03-1363, and 03-1364). Case No. 03-1361 was filed by 
Massachusetts (the only party found to have standing) and about a dozen other states and 
territories. The other petitions were filed by California (No. 03-1362), various environmental and 
public-interest groups (No. 03-1363), and cities (No. 03-1364).  
 128. The panel majority did not write an opinion explaining its denial of mandamus relief, but 
it appears from Judge Tatel’s separate opinion that the panel did not think that the EPA’s delay 
was egregious enough. Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 03-1361, slip op. at 2–3 (D.C. Cir, June 26, 
2008) (Tatel, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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some exceptions, courts usually do not apply the one-plaintiff rule 
when the plaintiffs seek damages.129 However, financial rewards accrue 
to prevailing parties even when damages are not sought. A prevailing 
party can sometimes recover attorneys’ fees, as in some federal civil 
rights cases and environmental cases.130 And regardless of the nature 
of the suit, prevailing parties are ordinarily entitled to recover the costs 
of the proceedings (filing fees, copying costs, etc.) in the trial court and 
on appeal.131 When these sorts of tangible benefits and detriments are 
at issue, courts often realize that an individualized standing analysis is 
necessary to avoid awarding fees or costs to a “prevailing” party who 
should not have been in the suit at all.132 But, surprisingly, they do not 
always recognize the problem, even at the highest court in the land. In 
Horne v. Flores,133 two groups of petitioners obtained Supreme Court 
review. The two sets of petitioners were represented by different 
attorneys. The Court bypassed the standing inquiry for one group 
based on the one-plaintiff rule, and the petitioners’ position prevailed 
on the merits.134 The Supreme Court’s judgment awarded court costs 
separately to both sets of petitioners, despite the fact that one group 
had not been determined to have standing.135 Perhaps the Court 
intended to treat the bypassed parties as winners, but I suspect the real 
explanation is simple inattention. 
The one-plaintiff rule also sometimes leads to improper awards of 
attorneys’ fees. This has happened even in cases in which the plaintiffs 
are separately represented,136 but it happens with apparently greater 
 
 129. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 130. E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2012) (citizen suits under Clean Water Act); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988(b) (2012) (civil rights). When fee-eligible cases reach the Supreme Court, the fees are 
generally awarded by the lower court rather than being ordered by the Supreme Court itself. 
STEVEN M. SHAPIRO, KENNETH S. GELLER, TIMOTHY S. BISHOP, EDWARD A. HARNETT & DAN 
HIMMELFARB, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 854–55 (10th ed. 2013). 
 131. SUP. CT. R. 43; FED. R. CIV. P. 54; FED. R. APP. P. 39. 
 132. E.g., Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1988); Women’s Med. 
Ctr. of Providence, Inc. v. Roberts, 512 F. Supp. 316, 319–20 (D.R.I. 1981). 
 133. Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009).  
 134. Id. at 438, 446–47; see also supra notes 60–65 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Horne v. Flores, Nos. 08-289 & 08-294 (July 27, 2009) (issuing judgment).  
 136. In Shaw v. Hunt, 154 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit awarded fees to plaintiff-
intervenors who lacked standing but whose positions were allied with separately represented 
parties who did have standing. Id. at 163, 165–67. The court reasoned—incorrectly, according to 
the argument of this Article—that the plaintiff-intervenors did not require their own standing, 
and thus they could be “prevailing parties” because of their contributions to the case. Id. at 165–
67. 
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frequency when the plaintiffs have the same attorney. That is, some 
courts seem to believe that standing can be ignored even at the fees 
stage as long as the party whose standing is bypassed shared an 
attorney with a co-party who did have standing.137  Being represented 
by the same attorney is insufficient to support an award of fees either 
functionally or formally. As a functional matter, the need to represent 
several plaintiffs rather than one can be expected to increase expense, 
as the attorneys need to confer with more clients, prepare for 
additional depositions, and so on. As a formal matter, fee awards are 
not made in favor of attorneys but rather in favor of parties—parties 
who then, as a matter of contract, may or may not be obligated to pay 
some amount to their attorneys.138 Because parties are the awardees, it 
is problematic for a party who lacks standing to be awarded relief. 
Most of the discussion above concerns the problematic 
consequences of giving relief to plaintiffs who might actually lack 
standing. When a plaintiff whose standing is assumed instead goes on 
to lose on the merits, one is tempted to adopt a “no harm, no foul” 
approach. But that would be a mistake. Even when the plaintiffs lose 
on the merits, use of the one-plaintiff rule leads not just to an error of 
principle but also to practical problems. 
The practical problems arise because not all losses are created 
equal. The consequences for a losing plaintiff differ depending on how 
the plaintiff loses. A failure of standing is a jurisdictional defect that 
prevents a court from adjudicating the merits of a case.139 A dismissal 
for lack of standing therefore has very different preclusive effects than 
an adverse determination of the merits. In particular, a dismissal for 
lack of standing does not preclude later litigation of the merits of the 
same claim, provided the lack of standing can be overcome in the 
 
 137. E.g., Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691, 701–02 (9th Cir. 
1996). In Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936 (9th 
Cir. 2011), the court of appeals affirmed an award of attorneys’ fees to two groups even though it 
bypassed the standing inquiry for one of the groups. Id. at 943–44, 951. Further, the court of 
appeals granted the plaintiffs’ motion for fees expended on the appeal, again despite the absence 
of a ruling on one plaintiff’s standing. Order Granting Attorneys’ Fees, Comite de Jornaleros de 
Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936 (Nos. 06-55750, 06-56869) (ECF No. 125) (granting motion for 
attorneys’ fees). 
 138. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 591, 597–98 (2010) (construing Equal Access to Justice 
Act); Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 87–90 (1990) (construing 42 U.S.C. § 1988). 
 139. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 
750–54 (1984).  
BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017  11:16 AM 
2017] ONE GOOD PLAINTIFF 511 
second suit.140 As one federal court of appeals explained: 
Whether a dismissal is for want of jurisdiction, for failure to plead a 
claim, or for the failure to prove a genuinely disputed material fact is 
significant for more than technical reasons. A dismissal for want of 
jurisdiction bars access to federal courts and is res judicata only of the 
lack of a federal court’s power to act. It is otherwise without prejudice 
to the plaintiff’s claims, and the rejected suitor may reassert his claim 
in any competent court.141 
Thus, for example, a claim that has been dismissed for lack of standing 
in federal court may sometimes be brought in state court, where the 
standing requirements may be more lenient.142 
B. Indirect Effects of the One-Plaintiff Rule 
The one-plaintiff rule has other bad effects too. In particular, it 
can indirectly lead to overly broad injunctive relief and inhibit the 
development of precedent that would clarify standing doctrine. 
The problem of overly broad injunctions typically arises in cases 
challenging widely applicable government policies. A recent example 
is Texas v. United States, the case brought by twenty-six states to block 
the Obama administration’s “deferred action” immigration program.143 
The Fifth Circuit determined that one plaintiff state, Texas, had 
standing because state law provided that beneficiaries of deferred 
action would be able to obtain Texas driver’s licenses and the license 
 
 140. 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4436, at 149–179 (2d ed. 2002); see, e.g., Media Techs. Licensing, 
LLC. v. Upper Deck Co., 334 F.3d 1366, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Canadian 
Universal Ins. Co., 605 F.2d 1340, 1342–43 (5th Cir. 1979); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (providing 
that dismissals for lack of jurisdiction do not operate as an adjudication on the merits); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 (1982) (stating that a dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction does not preclude the plaintiff from asserting the same claim again). One might be 
inclined to say that it does not seem so unfair to preclude from further litigation the standingless 
plaintiff who is allowed by the one-plaintiff rule to proceed to the merits and lose; the plaintiff 
initiated the suit, after all. Notice, though, that the same logic could be used to impose claim 
preclusion against plaintiffs in single-plaintiff cases dismissed on standing grounds—but that is 
not the practice. 
 141. Daigle v. Opelousas Health Care, Inc., 774 F.2d 1344, 1348 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 142. See Watkins v. Resorts Int’l Hotel & Casino, Inc., 591 A.2d 592, 601–04 (N.J. 1991). In 
Watkins, it was not entirely clear that the prior federal judgment should have been characterized 
as based on lack of standing (or, at least, lack of Article III standing), but that is how the state 
court regarded the prior judgment. See id. at 603. 
 143. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided court, 
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).  
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fee did not fully cover the administrative costs of issuing a license.144 
Citing the one-plaintiff rule, the court deemed that economic harm 
sufficient to proceed to the merits with regard to all plaintiffs.145 The 
court then affirmed the district court’s order preliminarily enjoining 
enforcement of the program everywhere and with regard to all 
persons,146 despite the fact that fifteen states plus the District of 
Columbia had filed an amicus brief welcoming the administration’s 
policy.147 
Such an expansive injunction, especially at the preliminary stage, 
was improper. The proper scope of injunctive relief—and in particular 
whether an injunction may extend to nonplaintiffs—is admittedly a 
matter of some difficulty in the law of remedies.148 But the better view, 
because it respects the limits on the power of a single court and the 
distinction between class and nonclass litigation, is that a court should, 
as a general matter, issue injunctions that redress or prevent the 
plaintiff’s injury rather than broader injunctions that bind the 
defendant to behave similarly as to all other persons.149 Thus, a proper 
injunction in the immigration case, and others like it, would have gone 
 
 144. Id. at 150. In addition to finding that Texas had standing under the driver’s license theory, 
the district court also suggested there was standing under an “abdication theory” that apparently 
applied to all the states. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 624, 636, 643–44 (S.D. Tex. 
2015). The Fifth Circuit rested its standing decision on the licenses. Texas, 809 F.3d at 150. 
 145. Texas, 809 F.3d at 151. Indeed, the court mistakenly fell into stating that “the states”— 
that is, all of them—had standing. Id. at 162. 
 146. Id. at 188. 
 147. See Amicus Brief of the States of Washington et al. in Support of the United States at 
13–14, Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (No. 15-40238), 2015 WL 1611823, at *13–14 (Apr. 6, 2015).  
 148. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 276 (4th ed. 2010) (stating 
that “the cases are mixed, even within jurisdictions”); Maureen Carroll, Aggregation for Me, but 
Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 
2030–34 (2015) (describing the case law as unclear and citing competing approaches); Michael T. 
Morley, De Facto Class Actions? Plaintiff- and Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in Voting Rights, 
Election Law, and Other Constitutional Cases, 39 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 48, 521–38 (2016) 
(raising concerns about wide use of “defendant-oriented injunctions” that require governmental 
defendants to apply a ruling to all persons); see also Bray, supra note 16 (manuscript at 20) 
(arguing that national injunctions are a recent innovation without support in traditional equity 
practice). 
 149. In this regard, I agree with the views expressed in Josh Blackman & Howard M. 
Wasserman, The Process of Marriage Equality, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 249–50 (2016), 
and Marty Lederman, Understanding Standing: The Court’s Article III Questions in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Cases (VII), SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/ 
2013/01/understanding-standing-the-courts-article-iii-questions-in-the-same-sex-marriage-cases-
vii [https://perma.cc/3TPH-TKHT]. Both of these pieces argue for the principle that injunctions 
should generally benefit only the plaintiffs in a case. 
BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017  11:16 AM 
2017] ONE GOOD PLAINTIFF 513 
no further than necessary to protect the plaintiff state(s) that the court 
found to have standing. If Texas were the only plaintiff found to have 
standing, the preliminary injunction should have protected only Texas 
from the immigration policy.150 
To be clear, the excessively broad scope of the injunction in the 
“deferred action” case did not flow exclusively from use of the one-
plaintiff rule. After all, the district court issued and the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed an injunction that applied across the whole country, not just 
in the twenty-six plaintiff states, and that prevented anyone from 
benefiting from the policy, even persons who could not burden Texas 
or any other plaintiff state. Therefore, it is possible that the district 
court might have issued a universal injunction even if Texas had sued 
as a lone plaintiff and the court made no assumptions about other 
states. So the error may go beyond just embracing the one-plaintiff 
rule. 
Still, if the courts were required to conduct a plaintiff-by-plaintiff 
inquiry, it is at least plausible that the injunction would have been 
narrower in this case and others like it. That is especially true if some 
of the plaintiff states would, upon inquiry, be dismissed for lack of 
standing.151 But even if most or all of the plaintiff states would have 
been found to have standing, the need to undertake a more rigorous 
standing inquiry might have forced the court to think about how to 
protect the interests of the particular plaintiff states and of their sister 
states who disagreed with them, rather than thinking of the prevailing 
party as “the states” en bloc. The issuance of nationwide injunctions by 
district courts and the widespread use of the one-plaintiff rule reveal 
some similar assumptions or misconceptions about the nature of 
judicial power;152 more granular thinking about standing could thus be 
 
 150. Perhaps there would be administrative difficulties in temporarily having different 
policies in effect in different states, but it should have been up to the federal government to decide 
whether it valued the partial implementation of its policy enough to outweigh the administrative 
inconvenience of separate regimes. For its part, the federal government argued for limiting the 
injunction, so the government evidently thought it was possible to apply the policy in some states 
but not others, at least for a time. See Texas, 809 F.3d at 187. 
 151. As for the license-cost theory, which is the theory the Fifth Circuit adopted, it appears 
that some of the plaintiff states already offered driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants 
without suffering any financial detriment. See Amicus Brief of the States of Washington et al. in 
Support of Petitioners at 5, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674), 2016 WL 
922867, at *5. There were, of course, other potential theories of standing, though all of them were 
questionable.  
 152. See infra Part IV. 
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expected to foster more restrained use of remedies generally. 
In addition, the one-plaintiff rule has consequences for the 
development of precedent. In particular, pretermitting standing means 
that certain questions of standing, difficult ones most especially, are not 
resolved. For example, the doctrine of congressional standing could 
have been clarified earlier, sparing the lower courts more than a decade 
of missteps, had the Court been required to address it in Bowsher v. 
Synar rather than sidestepping it after finding one good nonlegislator 
plaintiff.153 It may be that decisions on standing are sufficiently fact 
specific, or ideologically manipulable, that precedent is not as 
systemically valuable in this context as in others, but presumably the 
creation of precedent has at least some value.154 
III.  WHY THE ONE-PLAINTIFF RULE IS WRONG—AND WHAT 
COURTS SHOULD DO INSTEAD 
Courts often repeat the one-plaintiff rule but rarely offer any 
justification for it, and scholarly commentary on the issue is rare. To 
the extent that there is a prevailing view of the rule’s propriety in the 
sparse literature on the topic, it endorses the rule.155 That view is 
 
 153. Compare Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986) (pretermitting a question of 
congressional standing), with Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820–30 (1997) (holding that members 
of Congress lacked standing to challenge Line Item Veto Act), and id. at 816–17, 820 n.4 (rejecting 
the D.C. Circuit’s existing case law on legislator standing). 
 154. If it is unnecessary to rule on the standing of additional parties once one plaintiff has 
been found to have standing, then those additional rulings are arguably dicta. See supra note 46 
and accompanying text. My argument, of course, is that it is necessary to rule on the standing of 
all plaintiffs because, for the reasons stated in Part III, the one-plaintiff rule is wrong. 
 155. The most extensive treatment of the permissibility of the one-plaintiff rule of which I am 
aware is that of Professor Steinman, supra note 15. Steinman focuses on the procedural effects of 
consolidating cases under Rule 42, but incident to that discussion she also considers joinder of 
plaintiffs under Rule 20. See, e.g., id. at 737–38. Steinman concludes that the one-plaintiff rule (or 
the “look only for one good plaintiff” rule, as she calls it) is consistent with Article III, the Rules 
Enabling Act, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 726–50. To the extent that allowing 
plaintiffs without standing to proceed to judgment would cause later difficulties, she indicates that 
collateral challenges may provide a partial response. Id. at 730–31. I am reluctant to disagree with 
Professor Steinman, but I note that she wrote without the benefit of later developments like Steel 
Co. and DaimlerChrysler. See infra Part III.A. I believe those developments have further 
undermined the one-plaintiff rule, though I would say it was wrong as a matter of first principles 
even before.  
I note as well that a recent article by Erik Zimmerman endorses the one-plaintiff rule as 
support for his argument that a plaintiff should be allowed to assert multiple claims without 
possessing standing for each claim, especially in the context of decisions about whether invalid 
portions of statutes are severable. Erik R. Zimmerman, Supplemental Standing for Severability, 
109 NW. U. L. REV. 285, 337–38 (2015); see also infra note 257 (discussing Zimmerman’s position). 
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mistaken. The one-plaintiff rule is unlawful, and it should be rejected. 
It is tempting to view the validity of the one-plaintiff rule as pitting 
a pragmatic case for the rule against a formalist argument rejecting it. 
And there is indeed some truth to that characterization. The argument 
in favor of the one-plaintiff rule, to the extent it is articulated at all, is 
mostly driven by functional or pragmatic considerations such as judicial 
economy. The case against the one-plaintiff rule emphasizes Article 
III’s limits. Nonetheless, it is an oversimplification to cast the dispute 
as a stark conflict between formalism and functionalism. The case 
against the one-plaintiff rule draws on some functional considerations, 
and the case for the one-plaintiff rule obviously tries to show that the 
rule satisfies constitutional requirements. 
Before making the argument against the one-plaintiff rule, it is 
worth acknowledging that the Supreme Court’s law of standing 
remains controversial and contested. The scholarly literature contains 
some powerful indictments of the Court’s jurisprudence and, in 
particular, its requirement of personalized injury in fact.156 My own 
sympathies lie with an approach to Article III standing that is 
somewhat more pragmatic and generous than the approach the Court 
now embraces, especially in cases in which Congress has tried to 
identify previously noncognizable harms and create statutory 
remedies. But none of that unease with the current doctrine affects the 
argument against the one-plaintiff rule: even if standing should be 
somewhat looser, all plaintiffs in a case still need it. Although the 
Court’s approach to standing may well change at the margins as the 
Court’s personnel and priorities shift, the Court’s approach is unlikely 
to liberalize in the radical way that would be necessary to legitimize the 
one-plaintiff rule, which, when properly understood, is a major 
departure from the fundamentals of standing.157 
 
 156. See generally William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); 
James E. Pfander, Standing to Sue: Lessons from Scotland’s Actio Popularis, 66 DUKE L.J. 1493 
(2017); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article 
III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). But see generally Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does 
History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004) (defending standing doctrine 
against some historical criticisms). 
 157. The Court has shown unanimous support for the proposition that a party must have 
standing for each claim it wishes to litigate. See infra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. Even 
if the Court took the highly unlikely step of eliminating standing as a separate constitutional 
requirement and instead treated standing as a question of whether a particular party has a cause 
of action, cf. Fletcher, supra note 156 (urging such an approach), that probably would not justify 
the one-plaintiff rule. That one plaintiff has a cause of action would not seem to justify allowing 
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This Part’s argument against the one-plaintiff rule has several 
components, so an outline of the argument may be helpful. Section A 
provides the core of the argument that the Constitution requires all 
plaintiffs in a federal case to have standing. Section B takes on the 
economy-based justification for the one-plaintiff rule and shows that it 
fails on its own terms. Section C explains why courts cannot defer 
matters of standing until the remedial stage of a case. Section D argues 
that stare decisis cannot save the one-plaintiff rule. Section E sets out 
the correct way for courts to deal with standing in multiple-plaintiff 
cases. 
A. The Case Against the One-Plaintiff Rule 
This Section begins by explaining why the one-plaintiff rule is 
inconsistent with the nature of Article III judicial power. It then goes 
on to explain that a plaintiff’s lack of standing cannot be overcome 
through party-joinder rules or concepts of supplemental standing, nor 
can judicial economy justify bypassing standing. 
1. Article III Standing and the Nature of Judicial Judgments.  
Article III vests the federal courts with the “judicial power” and limits 
that power to the adjudication of certain “cases” and 
“controversies.”158 This rather sparse text has generated a bevy of 
doctrines intended to keep the federal courts within their “proper—
and properly limited—role.”159 Probably chief among these limitations 
on judicial power is the doctrine of constitutional standing. As the 
Supreme Court has explained: 
In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled 
to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular 
issues. . . . In its constitutional dimension, standing imports 
justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a “case or 
controversy” between himself and the defendant within the meaning 
of Art. III.160 
To have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must have suffered an 
 
a co-plaintiff without one to proceed to judgment. Cf. infra text accompanying note 288 (making 
similar point in the context of the “zone of interests” doctrine). The development of standing as 
a nonmerits threshold doctrine may have, perversely, allowed the one-plaintiff rule’s rise. 
 158. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2. 
 159. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 160. Id. For the subconstitutional, or “prudential,” aspects of standing, see infra Part III.E.5. 
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injury in fact that is traceable to the defendant’s conduct and likely to 
be redressed by the plaintiff’s requested remedy.161 
The Supreme Court usually presents its constitutional standing 
jurisprudence as an interpretation and elaboration of the “case or 
controversy” language, but for present purposes the “judicial power” 
language to which it is wedded probably provides the best lens through 
which to perceive the one-plaintiff rule’s faults. The requirement of 
standing (along with other constitutional justiciability doctrines) 
ensures that the federal courts exercise only properly judicial power. 
In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation 
of Church & State, Inc.,162 the Court articulated this relationship 
between standing and judicial power: 
The power to declare the rights of individuals and to measure the 
authority of governments, this Court said 90 years ago, “is legitimate 
only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, 
earnest and vital controversy.” Otherwise, the power “is not judicial 
. . . in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution 
to the courts of the United States.” 
  As an incident to the elaboration of this bedrock requirement, this 
Court has always required that a litigant have “standing” to challenge 
the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit.163  
The further requirement that every plaintiff in a case possess 
standing derives from the nature of judicial judgments. The judicial 
power is a power to issue dispositive judgments in cases over which the 
courts have jurisdiction.164 Judgments are specific to the parties before 
the court. The judgment resolving a case establishes the parties’ rights 
and duties: D owes P the sum of $100,000, D has violated the due 
process rights of P1 and P2 and is enjoined from doing so further, etc. 
The judgment may be accompanied by an opinion that may establish 
law for future cases. The decision’s precedential value, if any, is 
available to everyone. But the parties get the judgment that definitively 
 
 161. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 162. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464 (1982).  
 163. Id. at 471 (citations omitted) (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 143 
U.S. 339, 345 (1982); and then quoting United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 48 (1852)); 
see also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) (describing the judicial power as “the 
right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants”). 
 164. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 217–25 (1995); William Baude, The 
Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1815–31 (2008). 
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decides their rights and liabilities.165 The one-plaintiff rule’s crucial 
error is that it overlooks the person-specific nature of judgments and 
thereby elides the difference between parties and nonparties. 
This error is on display in the Supreme Court’s most recent 
engagement with the one-plaintiff rule, Town of Chester v. Laroe 
Estates. As noted above, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
determination of whether an additional plaintiff needs to have standing 
depends on whether that plaintiff seeks relief that is “different from 
that which is sought by a party with standing.”166 In addition to the 
considerable difficulties inherent in trying to decide whether relief is 
the same or different—which the Court left for the court of appeals to 
sort out on remand—the question itself is founded on a mistake. Relief 
for different people is necessarily different relief because it changes the 
(again, person-specific) judgment in the case. Someone without 
standing is not a proper party to invoke the judicial—that is, judgment-
issuing, rights-determining—power and therefore should not receive 
any judgment, even if “only” for nonmonetary relief like a declaration 
of unconstitutionality or for a joint money judgment. The Court in 
Town of Chester did not try to grapple with any of this but instead 
issued a short opinion that relied largely on the parties’ purported 
agreement with the basic idea of the one-plaintiff rule and remedy-
based distinctions implicit in the existing case law.167 
To the extent that one could reconcile the one-plaintiff rule with 
the demands of Article III, the most plausible argument would be that 
a federal court’s authority extends to the entire case or controversy 
 
 165. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“The Art. III judicial power exists only to 
redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court’s 
judgment may benefit others collaterally.”); Stryker v. Crane, 123 U.S. 527, 539–40 (1887) 
(distinguishing between the force of a judgment and the lesser force of a precedent); Judgment, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A court’s final determination of the rights and 
obligations of the parties in a case.”). To say that judgments apply only to specific persons does 
not mean that the judgment must individually name them; on the contrary, a judgment can 
describe them, as in class actions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3); 1 A.C. FREEMAN, TREATISE OF 
THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS 950–54 (Edward W. Tuttle ed., 5th ed. 1925). Note that we are not 
concerned here with judgments in rem, which are traditionally said to determine ownership of an 
item of property as against the whole world.  
 166. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017); supra Part I.B.2. 
 167. Town of Chester, 137 S. Ct. at 1651–52. One virtue of relying on party concessions, one 
hopes, is that doing so makes it easier for the Court to change course in a future case. In the spirit 
of full disclosure, I note that I submitted an amicus brief in Town of Chester. The brief argued 
that the case could be resolved on narrow grounds (similar to those the Court relied on) but also 
urged the Court to rethink its one-plaintiff doctrine more generally, which the Court did not do.  
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before it, so that once one plaintiff with standing creates an Article III 
case, other plaintiffs, with or without standing, may join the case 
without violating Article III. That is, one could envision a doctrine of 
“supplemental standing” as an analogue to the supplemental subject-
matter jurisdiction recognized in cases such as United Mine Workers of 
America v. Gibbs168 and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
But that theory of supplemental standing does not work. As a 
practical matter, an obvious sign of trouble is that the theory could 
license the joinder of innumerable interested-but-uninjured plaintiffs 
who disfavor the same law or action. And as a matter of constitutional 
text and principle, standingless plaintiffs are impermissible because the 
thing that extends to an entire case is the Article III judicial power. 
Whatever claims and parties a case may encompass, a federal court can 
only deal with them judicially. To be a federal plaintiff invoking the 
judicial power is to aim at the goal of a favorable judicial judgment: 
that is what a plaintiff’s complaint must demand, and an enforceable 
judgment granting relief and backed by the power of the United States 
is what a successful plaintiff receives.169 Given that judgments operate 
for and against specific people, it follows that each person invoking this 
judgment-issuing power must have standing. 
That is the core of the Article III case against the one-plaintiff 
rule. To flesh out the case and respond to counterarguments, it is 
necessary to consider the role of joinder rules and supplemental 
jurisdiction in defining the scope of a case, the doctrine of hypothetical 
jurisdiction, and the potential relevance of judicial economy. The 
following subsections turn to those tasks. 
2. The Relationship Between Joinder Rules, Supplemental 
Jurisdiction, and the One-Plaintiff Rule.  The liberal joinder rules of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, combined with the doctrine of 
supplemental jurisdiction, can expand judicial power beyond those 
plaintiffs and claims that can enter federal court on their own. 
Nonetheless, none of these rules or doctrines can extend constitutional 
standing to a plaintiff who would not have standing if suing alone. 
Consider the following scenario. A person with an intense interest 
 
 168. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
 169. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 54; cf. Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1053 (2016) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“Article III does not give federal courts the power to order relief to 
any uninjured plaintiff, class action or not.”). 
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in protecting the environment—call him Plaintiff 1—seeks injunctive 
relief against a federal agency because the agency, in alleged violation 
of federal environmental laws, has approved a development project 
that would ruin an area of great natural beauty. If Plaintiff 1 has 
nothing more at stake than his sincere and powerful concerns for 
environmental preservation and governmental compliance with 
environmental law, this suit lacks the “injury in fact” required for 
Article III standing.170 Consider now a different plaintiff—call her 
Plaintiff 2—who files a separate lawsuit over the same development 
project, but this plaintiff actually uses the area in question and will no 
longer be able to enjoy the unspoiled landscape if the allegedly illegal 
project proceeds. Plaintiff 2 does have an Article III injury.171 Plaintiff 
1’s case should be dismissed for want of standing, but Plaintiff 2’s case 
may proceed, at least as far as “injury in fact” is concerned. 
The next step is now obvious: Suppose that Plaintiff 1 and Plaintiff 
2 decide to sue together, joining their claims under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 20, which permits parties to join as plaintiffs when they 
assert claims that arise from the same events and present common 
questions of law or fact.172 They will assert identical claims and seek 
identical injunctive relief. Can Plaintiff 1 invoke Article III jurisdiction 
on the strength of Plaintiff 2’s standing? Under the one-plaintiff rule, 
the answer is yes. The correct answer should instead be no, though 
getting to that answer takes a bit of explanation. 
We can begin with Rule 82, which provides that “[t]hese rules do 
not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts or the venue of 
actions in those courts.”173 On one possible reading, Rule 82 means that 
a claim over which the federal courts lack jurisdiction when filed by 
itself cannot come within their jurisdiction just by being combined, 
 
 170. See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009); Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727, 735–40 (1972). 
 171. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183 
(2000); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 n.4 (1986). 
 172. One might wonder whether the mere fact that multiple people are challenging the same 
law provides a sufficient basis to support joinder under the terms of Rule 20, which requires not 
just “[common] question[s] of law or fact”—a requirement that is satisfied due to the plaintiffs’ 
advancing the same legal challenge—but also that the plaintiffs’ claims “aris[e] out of the same 
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” FED. R. CIV. P. 20(a)(1). In 
many public-law cases challenging the validity of a law, the only relevant events are the law’s 
enactment and its application, in separate but similar events, to the different plaintiffs—or, 
indeed, the expectation that the law would be (again, separately) applied to the plaintiffs in the 
future.  
 173. FED. R. CIV. P. 82.  
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through the Rules’ joinder provisions, with another claim that does 
invoke jurisdiction. Rule 82’s usual application is to prevent expansion 
of statutory jurisdiction, but, as the Supreme Court has stated, Rule 82 
“applies a fortiori to any effort to extend by rule the judicial power of 
the United States described in Article III of the Constitution.”174 
One might think that Rule 82 straightforwardly outlaws the one-
plaintiff rule, and indeed some litigants have made that argument, but 
the matter is actually a bit more complicated than the simple 
interpretation of the rule suggests. As the architects of the Federal 
Rules explained, and as case law both before and after the 
promulgation of the Rules showed, joinder rules can permissibly have 
the indirect effect of expanding subject-matter jurisdiction by 
increasing the size of the relevant litigation unit—that is, the case—to 
which the preexisting jurisdictional rules are applied. In other words, 
joinder rules may bring into a unitary federal case some claims and 
parties that would not independently satisfy the requirements of 
federal subject-matter jurisdiction.175 
The jurisdictional authority to entertain such additional claims 
came, initially, from the judicially developed doctrines known as 
ancillary, pendent, and pendent-parties jurisdiction. The basic idea of 
these doctrines was that efficiency counselled, and the Constitution 
permitted, the federal courts to exercise power over an entire 
transactionally unified controversy, even if some claims or parties 
bound up in it did not have their own jurisdictional basis.176 To take one 
example, consider a Rule 14 impleader claim based on state law and 
 
 174. Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 135 (1992).  
 175. See Lesnik v. Pub. Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 973 (2d Cir. 1944) (acknowledging Rule 82 
but stating that “jurisdiction is not extended by mere devices making possible more complete 
adjudication of issues in a single case” and that “a mere broadening of the content of a single 
federal action must not be confused with the extension of federal power”); 12 WRIGHT ET AL., 
supra note 123, § 3141, at 555–58; Carole E. Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on 
Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 395, 431–43 (1976). See generally Richard A. Matasar, 
Rediscovering “One Constitutional Case”: Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test 
for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1399 (1983) (arguing that the constitutional 
scope of supplemental jurisdiction is coextensive with the scope of lawfully adopted joinder rules).  
 176. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1966); see also George 
B. Fraser, Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts of Actions Involving Multiple Claims, 76 F.R.D. 525 
(1978) (describing the scope of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction). For a summary of ancillary 
and pendent jurisdiction before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Harry 
Shulman & Edward C. Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 
YALE L.J. 393, 420 (1936). 
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brought by a defendant against a nondiverse third party.177 That 
impleader claim could not, standing on its own, satisfy the 
requirements of federal-question or diversity jurisdiction because it 
arises under state law and involves two nondiverse parties. Yet courts 
would entertain such claims as a matter of ancillary jurisdiction.178 
Though this was initially the result of judicially created doctrine, the 
supplemental-jurisdiction statute now lends the practice express 
statutory authority.179 
In these types of cases, liberal joinder rules provide the 
opportunity for the exercise of reserves of whole-case-encompassing 
jurisdiction that might otherwise lie dormant. Such examples show that 
the simple Rule 82 argument sketched above—if no jurisdiction as an 
independent case, then no jurisdiction when joined—is a little too 
simple and, in fact, does not align with longstanding practices.180 
However, neither is it the case that proper joinder under the Rules 
automatically means proper jurisdiction over all joined claims. Far 
from it. The law of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction was complicated, 
but in the context of multiple plaintiffs, the Supreme Court did not 
allow plaintiffs whose claims fell short of the required jurisdictional 
amount to obtain jurisdiction by joining with another plaintiff who had 
an independently sufficient claim.181 Moreover, those cases involved 
plaintiffs and claims that failed to satisfy only a statutory requirement 
 
 177. FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a) (permitting a defending party to join a nonparty who may be liable 
for all or part of the judgment against the defending party). 
 178. E.g., Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 716–17 (5th 
Cir. 1970) (counterclaim by nondiverse third-party defendant); City of Boston v. Boston Edison 
Co., 260 F.2d 872, 874 (1st Cir. 1958) (cross-claims between nondiverse co-defendants); Morrell 
v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757, 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (impleader claim in which 
defendant and one third-party defendant were not diverse). 
 179. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012). 
 180. One might wonder what Rule 82 means if it does not mean that a claim that is 
jurisdictionally deficient when filed alone cannot become sufficient through joinder. Perhaps the 
correct meaning of Rule 82 is that the Rules do not and may not directly expand jurisdiction, 
though they may do so incidentally through their properly procedural functions (promoting the 
just and economical resolution of disputes, etc.). See Goldberg, supra note 175, at 441–43. 
 181. E.g., Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (“Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be 
dismissed from the case—‘one plaintiff may not ride in on another’s coattails.’” (quoting Zahn v. 
Int’l Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (2d Cir. 1972))); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590 
(1939) (“Proper practice requires that where each of several plaintiffs is bound to establish the 
jurisdictional amount with respect to his own claim, the suit should be dismissed as to those who 
fail to show that the requisite amount is involved.”); Hackner v. Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y., 117 F.2d 
95, 97–98 (2d Cir. 1941).  
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of subject-matter jurisdiction. If the principles of ancillary and pendent 
jurisdiction did not even allow an additional plaintiff to overcome the 
statutory impediment of an insufficient amount in controversy, then it 
is hard to fathom how an analogous theory of “pendent-plaintiff 
standing” could provide a ticket into federal court for a plaintiff who 
lacks constitutional standing altogether. 
The supplemental-jurisdiction statute enacted in 1990 overrules 
some of the prior case law that had limited jurisdiction over joined 
plaintiffs, but it does not authorize the one-plaintiff rule either. The 
statute extends statutory subject-matter jurisdiction over certain claims 
that are transactionally related to a claim that has its own original basis 
for subject-matter jurisdiction, and this expansion applies even when 
the related claims are brought by a new plaintiff.182 As the Supreme 
Court has interpreted the statute, a plaintiff asserting a claim with an 
insufficient amount in controversy can now get into federal court by 
joining, under Rule 20 or 23, with a plaintiff whose claim is sufficient.183 
But it is well established that the supplemental-jurisdiction statute does 
not confer Article III standing on new parties or claims.184 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has told us that transactional 
relatedness between claims cannot overcome a lack of standing. In 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno,185 the plaintiffs challenged the legality 
of both a municipal tax exemption and a state tax credit. The Supreme 
Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue a challenge to 
the state tax credit, which was considered its own claim.186 The plaintiffs 
 
 182. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (authorizing jurisdiction over transactionally related claims 
“includ[ing] claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties”). 
 183. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 549, 566–67 (2005). The 
statute does not override the complete diversity rule, which is only a requirement of statutory 
jurisdiction. See id. at 553–54. Thus, the statute extends jurisdiction over an additional plaintiff 
with an insufficient amount in controversy, but it still requires that this plaintiff (like all plaintiffs 
in a diversity case) be diverse in citizenship from all defendants. 
 184. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 351–52 (2006) (rejecting the analogy 
between supplemental statutory jurisdiction and standing); Turner v. City & Cty. of San 
Francisco, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (stating that “Article III standing must be 
established for each claim, including those over which there is supplemental jurisdiction”); 
Montoya ex rel. S.M. v. Espanola Pub. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1310 (D.N.M. 
2012) (stating that “[t]here is no case law which supports Plaintiff’s position” that a plaintiff need 
not satisfy Article III standing requirements for supplemental claims under section 1367). It is not 
clear to me that the defect in Montoya was actually an Article III defect rather than a failure on 
the merits, but that is how the court understood it. 
 185. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006). 
 186. Id. at 346. 
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nonetheless argued that their (assumed) standing to challenge the 
municipal tax exemption gave them standing to challenge the state tax 
credit on the theory that the two challenges derived from a common 
nucleus of operative fact and thus composed a single “case” according 
to the jurisdictional test of Gibbs.187 The Court rejected this notion of 
“ancillary standing.”188 
  What we have never done is apply the rationale of Gibbs to permit 
a federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim that 
does not itself satisfy those elements of the Article III inquiry, such 
as constitutional standing, that “serv[e] to identify those disputes 
which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.” We 
see no reason to read the language of Gibbs so broadly, particularly 
since our standing cases confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate 
standing for each claim he seeks to press.189 
DaimlerChrysler’s rejection of supplemental standing came in the 
context of a plaintiff with multiple, related claims. It did not 
contemplate the addition of plaintiffs with no cognizable injury at all, 
which, given the person-specific nature of judgments, is at least as 
problematic.190 
Further, excluding additional plaintiffs who lack standing is 
desirable from the point of view of the relevant functional concerns. 
Allowing federal jurisdiction to extend to claims that are 
jurisdictionally defective on their own can sometimes promote the 
rational, efficient adjudication of the whole dispute between all of the 
affected parties.191 That laudable goal is generally promoted, the 
Supreme Court tells us in Gibbs, when we allow the federal court to 
hear together all of the claims that arise from the same nucleus of 
operative fact.192 But the one-plaintiff rule does not promote optimal 
packaging of the various claims and parties that together flesh out an 
entire controversy, for it invites into the case parties who do not have 
 
 187. Id. at 350–51 (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)). 
 188. Id. at 353. 
 189. Id. at 351–52 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 
495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)).  
 190. Cf. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 549 (1989) (“Our cases show . . . that with 
respect to the addition of parties, as opposed to the addition of only claims, we will not assume 
that the full constitutional power has been congressionally authorized, and will not read 
jurisdictional statutes broadly.”). 
 191. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725–26 (1966). 
 192. See id. 
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a redressable injury at all. The only commonality among the plaintiffs 
is that they all challenge the same law or policy, but because the 
additional plaintiffs need not have an actual injury, there is no logical 
stopping point to how many might be added on a supplemental-
standing theory. This leads to absurdities. If you were sensitive, 
attentive, and litigious enough, then you, gentle reader, could be a 
supplemental-standing plaintiff in hundreds of cases every year. 
Provided just one plaintiff in each of your cases has standing, your own 
standing need never be shown or found—and you could even win lots 
of favorable judgments. 
Based on the foregoing arguments, it appears that Congress lacks 
the constitutional power to enact a “supplemental standing” statute 
that would, like the judicially developed one-plaintiff rule, allow 
multiple-plaintiff cases to be decided on the merits as to all parties as 
long as one plaintiff has standing. The Supreme Court’s cases are full 
of statements about the inflexible, legislatively unalterable nature of 
Article III’s standing requirement. “It is settled that Congress cannot 
erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the 
right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.”193 
More broadly, the federal courts have only “judicial” power, which has 
been understood to prohibit them from adjudicating the rights of mere 
interested bystanders.194 A supplemental-standing statute would 
license the federal courts to adjudicate not just the wrong kind of 
case—such as a state-law claim between nondiverse parties—but to act 
as something other than a federal court exercising the Article III 
judicial power.195 The violation is all the worse if the overstepping is the 
product of judicial design rather than legislative authorization, as the 
 
 193. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997); see also Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (“In no event . . . may Congress abrogate the Art. III 
minima . . . .”). 
 194. See supra Part III.A. 
 195. As two commentators have stated in another context: 
[T]here is a key conceptual difference between issue- or party-based limits on federal 
subject matter jurisdiction and the case-or-controversy requirement that renders a 
violation of the latter considerably more troubling: when a court violates the case-or-
controversy requirement, it ceases to act like a court. This is not so when a court violates 
an issue- or party-based limit.  
Martin H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III Standing: A Proposed Solution to the 
Serious (but Unrecognized) Separation of Powers Problem, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1388 (2014); 
cf. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that “an Article III case or 
controversy, once joined by intervenors who lack standing, is—put bluntly—no longer an Article 
III case or controversy”). 
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one-plaintiff rule is, for then it is usurpation as well. 
In any event, even if the language of Article III is open-textured 
enough to give Congress the power to enact a supplemental-standing 
statute, Congress has not done so. Section 1367 certainly is not such a 
statute, for the reasons already explained.196 And the familiar doctrine 
of avoiding interpretations of statutes that raise doubtful questions 
about congressional authority197 would require that Congress speak 
clearly before the courts find that it has attempted to achieve such a 
result. For similar reasons, the Rules Enabling Act should not be read 
to license procedural rules that confer standing on additional parties, 
even if that were constitutionally possible.198 
3. Judicial Economy Cannot Justify Skipping over Standing.  The 
one-plaintiff rule is justified largely on grounds of judicial economy: if 
a court is going to resolve the merits anyway due to the presence of one 
plaintiff with standing, resolving difficult standing issues for co-
plaintiffs is a waste of effort. The economy gains are themselves 
overstated, as will be explained shortly.199 But even if the one-plaintiff 
rule serves judicial economy, that benefit cannot justify skipping over 
standing. 
Probably the best illustration of the limited role of economy-based 
arguments in this context comes from Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
 
 196. See supra notes 182–92 and accompanying text.  
 197. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise 
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless 
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”). 
 198. The Rules Enabling Act authorizes the courts to promulgate “rules of practice and 
procedure” and mandates that the rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). The Act’s relationship to jurisdiction is a bit obscure. Compare 
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 (1941) (“There are other limitations upon the authority 
to prescribe rules which might have been, but were not mentioned in the Act; for instance, the 
inability of a court, by rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute.”), and 
Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking “Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 47, 94 (1998) (stating that “‘[s]ubstantive rights,’ as the term is used in the 
Act, includes matters, such as subject matter jurisdiction, as to which rulemaking authority could 
not constitutionally be delegated to the Court”), with Goldberg, supra note 175, at 433–41 
(arguing that subject-matter jurisdiction is “procedural” for purposes of the Rules Enabling Act 
but that the rules are not permitted to define Article III boundaries, as opposed to 
subconstitutional jurisdictional limits), and 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2012) (authorizing courts to 
promulgate rules permitting interlocutory appeals).  
 199. See infra Part III.B. 
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Environment.200 In Steel Co., the Supreme Court disapproved the 
concept of “hypothetical jurisdiction,” according to which a federal 
court could “proceed immediately to the merits [of the case], despite 
jurisdictional objections, at least where (1) the merits question is more 
readily resolved, and (2) the prevailing party on the merits would be 
the same as the prevailing party were jurisdiction denied.”201 The Court 
rejected hypothetical jurisdiction because a court without authority 
cannot determine the merits, even if only to determine the merits 
against a plaintiff who may upon careful inquiry have also failed on 
jurisdictional grounds.202 The jurisdictional question in Steel Co. itself 
was one of Article III standing.203 The Court was accordingly required 
to address standing as a threshold matter and, upon doing so, found 
that the plaintiff lacked standing. The Court therefore did not reach 
the merits.204 
The one-plaintiff rule might be considered a form of partial 
hypothetical jurisdiction: although jurisdiction in the form of Article 
III standing is not assumed for the whole case, it is still assumed as to 
some parties. To that extent, using the one-plaintiff rule is, as Steel Co. 
puts it, “by very definition . . . to act ultra vires.”205 
The argument against the one-plaintiff rule based on Steel Co. is 
subject to two potential responses. One is more promising than the 
other, but neither ultimately succeeds in vindicating the one-plaintiff 
rule. 
First, there are some exceptions to Steel Co.’s rule against 
pretermitting questions of standing. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, 
joined by Justice Kennedy, was necessary to make a majority for the 
relevant portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion of the Court, and Justice 
O’Connor was willing to allow that future cases could present 
appropriate occasions for deviating from a strict jurisdiction-first 
approach.206 And, indeed, in subsequent cases the Court did allow 
 
 200. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
 201. Id. at 94, 93. 
 202. Id. at 94–95. 
 203. Id. at 102. 
 204. Id. at 102, 109–10. 
 205. Id. at 102. 
 206. See id. at 110–11 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I write separately to note that, in my view, 
the Court’s opinion should not be read as cataloging an exhaustive list of circumstances under 
which federal courts may exercise judgment in ‘reserv[ing] difficult questions of . . . jurisdiction 
when the case alternatively could be resolved on the merits in favor of the same party.’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 532 (1976)); see also Jack H. 
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various kinds of jurisdictional questions to be skipped over in favor of 
various kinds of nonjurisdictional-yet-threshold inquiries. For 
example, the Court has allowed determinations of jurisdiction to be 
pretermitted in favor of dismissals on grounds of forum non 
conveniens,207 and it has ruled that class certification can be denied 
when certification presents questions “logically antecedent” to 
questions of Article III standing.208 The Court also allowed a question 
of Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity, which is a type of 
jurisdictional question, to be pretermitted in order to rule that the 
statute giving rise to the claim at issue did not even encompass the state 
as a defendant.209 
Steel Co. may be permeable, but the one-plaintiff rule cannot fit 
within the letter or the logic of the exceptions described above. The 
one-plaintiff rule involves skipping a question of Article III 
jurisdiction—the most fundamental limit on federal judicial power—in 
order to resolve a plaintiff’s claim on ordinary merits grounds. No 
Supreme Court case elaborating on or limiting Steel Co. has licensed 
that. Rather, the cases that qualify Steel Co. give courts discretion to 
choose among threshold nonmerits grounds.210 Notably, even the case 
that bypassed state sovereign immunity in order to decide a question 
of statutory coverage still decided a question of Article III standing 
before reaching any other ground for decision.211 Further, in cases 
involving the one-plaintiff rule, the resolution of the merits question is 
generally not logically antecedent to the standing inquiry, a feature that 
has sometimes justified resolving a nonjurisdictional ground first.212 
Finally, it bears remembering that all of these hypothetical-jurisdiction 
cases involve decisions against plaintiffs. Some cases under the one-
plaintiff rule go on to rule against the supplemental plaintiff(s) on the 
merits, but others rule in favor of the supplemental plaintiff(s), a result 
the hypothetical-jurisdiction cases would not have dreamed of. 
 
Friedenthal, The Crack in the Steel Case, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 258, 265–66 (2000) (describing 
the uncertainty over the scope of the Steel Co. holding caused by the multiple conflicting opinions 
in the case). 
 207. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007). This case 
involved questions of personal jurisdiction and statutory subject-matter jurisdiction, though not 
Article III jurisdiction. 
 208. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999). 
 209. Vt. Nat. Res. Agency v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 779–80 (2000). 
 210. See Sinochem Int’l Co., 549 U.S. at 430–31. 
 211. Vt. Nat. Res. Agency, 529 U.S. at 771. 
 212. Id. at 779; Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 831. 
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A second argument against the decisiveness of Steel Co. contends 
that the one-plaintiff rule does not compromise the principles 
underlying standing doctrine in the same way that hypothetical 
jurisdiction does. In Steel Co. and most other hypothetical-jurisdiction 
cases, an assumption in favor of jurisdiction would allow the court to 
address a merits question that would not otherwise be addressed. In 
the cases at issue here, in contrast, the merits are going to be reached 
regardless, because at least one plaintiff has standing. The one-plaintiff 
rule therefore does not lead to a court resolving a question it otherwise 
would not resolve. In this way, the rule arguably does not entail a 
judicial usurpation of authority or otherwise offend the restraint-
oriented justifications for standing doctrine.213 Moreover, the presence 
of at least one plaintiff with a genuine stake in the controversy—as 
shown by having a redressable injury caused by the defendant—helps 
to ensure that the case will be vigorously contested, which serves 
another goal of standing doctrine.214 In this respect, the one-plaintiff 
rule is arguably less problematic than the doctrine of hypothetical 
jurisdiction condemned in Steel Co. 
This argument is more promising than the first one, but it is still 
not ultimately persuasive. The rule against hypothetical standing is not 
a rule about the generalized interest in restraining courts from reaching 
certain merits issues. It is a rule about judicial power to issue judgments 
on the merits.215 And judgments, unlike precedents, apply to specific 
persons.216 In Vermont Natural Resources Agency v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens,217 the Court justified its decision to pretermit Eleventh 
Amendment immunity based partly on the fact that doing so would not 
“permit the court to pronounce upon any issue, or upon the rights of 
any person, beyond the issues and persons that would be reached” 
 
 213. See Steinman, supra note 15, at 729–30; cf. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 
353 (2006) (condemning the plaintiffs’ “ancillary standing” theory and observing that it would 
lead to “federal courts thus deciding issues they would not otherwise be authorized to decide” 
(emphasis added)). 
 214. The relationship between vigorous contestation and constitutional injury is tenuous and 
unreliable, but standing doctrine does traditionally posit such a connection. See Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (observing that standing doctrine tries to “assure that concrete adverseness 
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination 
of difficult constitutional questions” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 
369, U.S. 186, 204 (1962))). 
 215. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). 
 216. See supra notes 118–20, 164–65 and accompanying text. 
 217. Vt. Nat. Res. Agency v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2006). 
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otherwise.218 The one-plaintiff rule, in contrast, allows courts to 
adjudicate the rights of persons outside of their power. In sum, the 
hypothetical-jurisdiction line of cases shows that judicial economy 
cannot authorize the one-plaintiff rule’s pretermission of standing. 
B. Rebutting the Efficiency-Based Case for the One-Plaintiff Rule 
The argument in favor of the one-plaintiff rule mostly relies on a 
pragmatic concern for judicial economy.219 Once a court determines 
that one plaintiff has standing, the court must proceed to the merits 
regardless of other plaintiffs’ standing, and so—the argument goes—
the other plaintiffs’ standing is then immaterial. And because deciding 
whether the other plaintiffs have standing would require some extra 
effort, particularly where those other plaintiffs’ standing is a close call, 
courts may properly dispense with a plaintiff-by-plaintiff analysis. 
Beyond judicial convenience, a further reason to avoid ruling on 
standing comes from the general policy of avoiding unnecessary 
constitutional decisions.220 
The previous Section explained why the relevant legal principles 
and precedents require that all plaintiffs have standing. This Section 
explains why the efficiency-based argument for the one-plaintiff rule 
fails even on its own terms. 
1. The One-Plaintiff Rule Is Not as Efficient as It Seems.  The first 
problem with the judicial-economy-based argument for the one-
plaintiff rule is that it starts from an incorrect premise, namely that the 
standing of other plaintiffs is immaterial once one proper plaintiff has 
been found. If in fact the standing of other plaintiffs mattered, though, 
then one could not so easily ignore it in the name of judicial 
convenience. And it does matter. That the standing of the other 
plaintiffs is important is especially clear when the plaintiffs end up 
winning on the merits. As discussed above, there are genuine benefits 
 
 218. Id. at 779 (emphasis added). 
 219. See Thiebaut v. Colo. Springs Utils., 455 Fed. App’x 795, 802 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing 
“judicial efficiency”); Steinman, supra note 15, at 729. 
 220. See Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n v. United States, 987 F.2d 806, 810 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing 
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance as support for the one-plaintiff rule); 13B WRIGHT ET 
AL., supra note 53, § 3531.15, at 337 (stating that “[t]he temptation to make unnecessary rulings 
as to the standing of surplus plaintiffs should be resisted”); see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (providing a classic statement of the 
avoidance policy). 
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that come along with winning a judgment as opposed to merely winning 
favorable precedent.221 The benefits are most obvious when matters 
like attorneys’ fees and costs are at issue, though as we have seen, 
courts are often, though not always, careful to conduct plaintiff-by-
plaintiff analyses when awarding such relief. But even apart from that, 
it matters whether one is a judgment holder or instead merely a 
nonparty who likes the outcome. For example, a prevailing plaintiff’s 
claims merge into the judgment as a matter of claim preclusion, the 
issues resolved in the plaintiff’s favor support issue preclusion in later 
litigation, a winning plaintiff can later enforce the judgment, and so on. 
When the plaintiffs whose standing is questionable are going to 
lose on the merits, the pragmatic argument for pretermitting standing 
has more appeal, though even here the gains are often illusory. True, it 
would be desirable to avoid the judicial effort required to say exactly 
why a plaintiff loses.222 That is a sure benefit of using the one-plaintiff 
rule. Still, even in this scenario, it is not irrelevant how a plaintiff loses. 
Different consequences attach to jurisdictional losses versus merits 
losses, such as different preclusive effects in later litigation.223 
Because of the different consequences of merits losses versus 
jurisdictional losses, the one-plaintiff rule saves some time in one case 
only to introduce the risk of inconvenience and uncertainty later. As a 
general rule, dismissals on the merits are preclusive of later litigation 
on the same claims or issues, but dismissals for want of standing do not 
preclude later litigation of the merits if the lack of standing can be 
overcome.224 When a plaintiff’s standing is bypassed under the one-
plaintiff rule, it may be unclear what preclusive effect to give the merits 
ruling as to that plaintiff.225 On the one hand, if the merits of the claims 
 
 221. See supra Part II.A. 
 222. As Justice Breyer asked in the context of hypothetical jurisdiction, “Whom does it help 
to have appellate judges spend their time and energy puzzling over the correct answer to an 
intractable jurisdictional matter, when (assuming an easy answer on the substantive merits) the 
same party would win or lose regardless?” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 
111 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 223. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.  
 224. See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text.  
 225. Sorting out preclusive effects was a problem under the old doctrine of hypothetical 
jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court has now largely disapproved but which still exists in some 
forms. For commentary taking different views on the matter, see, e.g., Joshua S. Stillman, 
Hypothetical Statutory Jurisdiction and the Limits of Federal Judicial Power, 68 ALA. L. REV. 493, 
541–44 (2016); Alan M. Trammell, Jurisdictional Sequencing, 47 GA. L. REV. 1099, 1147–49 
(2013); Ely Todd Chayet, Note, Hypothetical Jurisdiction and Interjurisdictional Preclusion: A 
“Comity” of Errors, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 96–101 (2000); Comment, Assuming Jurisdiction 
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and issues resolved in the first case are open to reexamination in a later 
suit, or if uncertainty over the judgment’s preclusive effects merely 
breeds later litigation, then we have undermined the efficiency 
rationale for pretermitting standing in the first place. On the other 
hand, to treat the first court’s determination of the merits as fully 
binding would be jarring given the doubt about the first court’s 
constitutional authority, a doubt that the court itself acknowledged yet 
intentionally disregarded.226 To be sure, it does not sit well to see a 
former plaintiff, who after all was the one invoking the federal court’s 
power, later deny the existence of that power when the merits turn out 
badly—and yet in some other circumstances we allow plaintiffs to 
launch belated attacks on subject-matter jurisdiction despite the odor 
of opportunism.227 Whichever approach we take, these are not good 
options. There are costs that come with choosing the path of immediate 
expediency represented by the one-plaintiff rule. 
2. Requiring All Plaintiffs To Have Standing Does Not Lead to 
Impracticalities or Bad Consequences.  The case in favor of the one-
plaintiff rule relies primarily on considerations of judicial economy. 
But requiring a standing inquiry for all plaintiffs is not so bad from the 
point of view of practicalities. It even has some practical virtues. 
First, deciding whether all plaintiffs have standing often would not 
require much additional judicial effort. When the plaintiffs in a case 
are similarly situated—for example, multiple users of a recreational 
area threatened with environmental harm—the standing inquiries will 
all be parallel, and so a court can handle them en bloc.228 
Second, even when some plaintiffs present distinctive and difficult 
standing questions, a court will not always have to resolve them. 
Although courts may not ignore standing, courts have enough 
 
Arguendo: The Rationale and Limits of Hypothetical Jurisdiction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 712, 754 
n.110 (1979); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: 
Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 308–32 
(2011) (emphasizing the important link between jurisdictional sequencing and preclusion). 
 226. If a case is litigated on the merits without any doubts about subject-matter jurisdiction 
being raised, the judgment can later withstand a collateral attack despite the undiscovered defect. 
See Chicot Cty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 12, 69 (1982). Our situation is different in that the potential defect 
was considered in the first case but then consciously disregarded. 
 227. E.g., Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804). 
 228. E.g., Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008); FEC v. Akins, 
524 U.S. 11 (1998); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997). In each of the multiple-plaintiff cases 
just cited, the Court conducted a single standing inquiry that applied equally to each plaintiff. 
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flexibility in managing dockets and sequencing decisions to help some 
standing questions disappear. Once a court finds standing for the most 
obviously injured plaintiff(s), or hints that such a ruling is likely, the 
defendant might agree to settle the case or the other plaintiffs might 
voluntarily dismiss themselves with the expectation that they will 
practically benefit from a victory by the remaining plaintiff. (The 
mechanics of how courts should rule on standing, and how much 
flexibility they have in determining exactly when to do so, are 
described in more detail below.229) 
Third, once the need for all plaintiffs to have standing becomes 
well established in the case law, some parties with questionable 
standing may no longer try to ride along as additional plaintiffs in a suit 
that has a clearly injured plaintiff. The burden of pleading and, if 
necessary, factually establishing standing is on the plaintiffs, not the 
court, and so supernumerary plaintiffs whose standing is questionable 
may have to face the costs of collecting affidavits, eating up pages of 
their briefs, and other efforts to establish their standing.230 When 
another plaintiff has standing and will secure relief that will practically 
benefit other potential plaintiffs, the cost may not be worth it. 
Fourth, rejecting the one-plaintiff rule would not deprive the 
public of judicial decisions on the merits of important questions. To be 
sure, the courts find it acceptable for there to be important disputes in 
which nobody can invoke judicial review.231 Yet even if one favored 
universal judicial review, the point of the one-plaintiff rule is that there 
already is another person who has standing to litigate the merits of the 
dispute, right there in the form of a co-plaintiff in the case at bar. So 
the same issues can be resolved regardless. 
Fifth, rejecting the one-plaintiff rule probably would not damage 
the quality of the litigation process. One might have that worry in the 
situation in which the would-be plaintiff without standing is a well-
equipped interest group while the plaintiff with standing is a concretely 
injured, but unsophisticated, individual. Of course, it is a general 
feature (or perhaps rather a bug) of standing doctrine, even in single-
plaintiff litigation, that it might select as a “proper” litigant someone 
 
 229. See infra Part III.E. 
 230. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance 
Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 188–89 (1936). 
 231. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) (“The 
assumption that if [these plaintiffs] have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a 
reason to find standing.”).  
BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017  11:16 AM 
534  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 67:481 
who does not appear likely to present the case in the strongest way.232 
As in other cases, there are ways to compensate for weak plaintiffs: the 
sophisticated party can file briefs as amicus curiae, provide pro bono 
representation to the injured-but-under-resourced party, and so on. 
Sixth, and as already noted, although the one-plaintiff rule may 
save a court from making a difficult standing decision in the case at 
hand, it does so at the cost of depriving the legal system of precedent.233 
Precedent on hard questions has value for the public and other courts. 
C. “Sort It Out Later” Is Not a Solution 
One potential response to the arguments above is to acknowledge 
that there is something problematic with giving benefits to plaintiffs 
who lack standing but, in response, to embrace a seemingly pragmatic 
compromise according to which standingless plaintiffs only need to be 
weeded out if and when it really “matters.” For example, if a plaintiff 
whose standing was initially pretermitted later tries to introduce 
distinct legal claims or enforce a judgment or obtain attorneys’ fees or 
take whatever actions a court believes would exceed the scope of the 
party’s supplemental standing, at that point the question of standing can 
be resolved and the plaintiff’s request granted or denied accordingly. 
This approach has some appeal, and it is probably what some 
courts applying the one-plaintiff rule assume will happen, but it will not 
work. As a doctrinal matter, standing is described as a threshold 
inquiry that must be satisfied to pursue relief, not just to get it.234 And 
during this meantime when it supposedly “doesn’t matter” whether a 
plaintiff has standing, the court is still exercising power on behalf of 
and against a plaintiff whose standing is openly in doubt. These 
activities might include granting preliminary relief, entering merits-
related discovery orders, dismissing a claim on the merits, allowing the 
party to put on evidence and cross-examine witnesses at trial, or 
granting a final judgment entitling all plaintiffs to injunctive relief. If 
the proponent of the pragmatic compromise concedes that at least 
some such exercises of power “matter,” as Supreme Court precedent 
suggests they do,235 then one cannot defer standing decisions for long. 
 
 232. Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738–41 (1972) (denying standing to the Sierra 
Club because of lack of allegations of particularized harm to a member). 
 233. See supra Part II.B.  
 234. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 235. Cf. U.S. Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc., 487 U.S. 72, 76–77 
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And so the compromise position unravels. 
Further, the pragmatic delaying tactic is not always so pragmatic 
when one thinks it through. To the extent that some standing inquiries 
are put off until a request for attorneys’ fees (which are common in 
cases against governmental defendants), the enforcement of the 
judgment, or another decision point, the effort involved in making a 
decision is merely shifted around. And, as noted already, leaving a 
plaintiff’s standing unresolved sows uncertainty that may crop up in 
subsequent litigation about the effects of the prior litigation.236 In sum, 
for both formal and functional reasons, sorting out standing at some 
indefinite future date is not a satisfactory response. The proper way for 
a district court to address standing—a way that respects Article III 
while also allowing some room for consideration of judicial economy—
is described below.237 
D. Does Stare Decisis Save the One-Plaintiff Rule? 
If the foregoing arguments are correct, the one-plaintiff rule never 
should have gotten off the ground. Even so, by this point more than 
two dozen Supreme Court cases, plus many more cases in the lower 
courts, have applied the one-plaintiff rule in one form or another. 
Although the Supreme Court has sometimes implicitly departed from 
the rule by conducting standing inquiries that the rule would deem 
unnecessary,238 the Court has never directly rejected the rule.239 The 
rule can therefore claim some authority, regardless of its correctness, 
simply as a matter of stare decisis. Accordingly, the proponent of 
 
(1988) (holding that nonparty witness may raise the court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in 
defense of a civil contempt citation for failure to respond to discovery requests, despite the 
absence of a final judgment in the underlying action). 
 236. See supra notes 224–27 and accompanying text. 
 237. See infra Part III.E. 
 238. See supra note 19. 
 239. Some litigants and lower courts have cited a passage from Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 
(1984), as a rejection of the one-plaintiff rule: “Typically, however, the standing inquiry requires 
careful judicial examination of a complaint’s allegations to ascertain whether the particular 
plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.” Id. at 752 (emphasis 
added); see supra note 47 (citing cases that rely on this passage). This reliance is ill placed. Allen 
did not involve any sort of supplemental-standing scenario. It did involve multiple plaintiffs, 
indeed a nationwide class action. Allen, 468 U.S. at 743. But it was not a case in which different 
plaintiffs were differently situated such that the Court undertook different standing inquires for 
different parties. Rather, the plaintiffs were found to lack standing, as a group, for reasons that 
applied in common to all. To use this language to undermine the one-plaintiff rule is to take it out 
of context. 
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change must present something more than an argument that the one-
plaintiff rule is wrong. That “something more” comes from three 
further considerations: lack of reliance on the one-plaintiff rule, the 
rule’s tension with other lines of precedent, and the rule’s unreasoned 
genesis and repetition. 
1. No Reliance Interests.  A crucial factor in deciding whether to 
overrule precedent is whether there has been reliance on the prior law 
such that overruling it would unfairly frustrate expectations.240 
Reliance interests are generally slight when it comes to matters of 
judicial procedure as compared, for example, to property rights or 
other substantive entitlements.241 That generalization holds true here. 
It is hard to imagine that the ill-defined generic category composed of 
parties who lack a constitutionally cognizable harm could have ordered 
their affairs around their ability to be a party when they join as co-
plaintiffs with parties who do have standing. The possibility of reliance 
further erodes given that the one-plaintiff rule is not mandatory; courts 
may choose to bypass standing of additional plaintiffs, but they are also 
permitted to analyze the standing of every plaintiff and dismiss those 
without standing.242 Some standingless plaintiffs, though not all, have 
gotten lucky in the past, but there is no right to good luck. 
2. Out of Step with Other Developments.  If a doctrine is out of step 
with other lines of precedent, that inconsistency both tends to show 
that the outlier doctrine is wrong and, more importantly here, militates 
in favor of jettisoning it so as to increase the overall coherence of the 
corpus juris.243 Admittedly, one might say that coherence-oriented 
arguments are not particularly compelling in the standing context, 
given that the whole doctrine is a bit wanting in coherence. Still, 
consistency is a virtue the law should strive to embody. Developments 
since the one-plaintiff rule’s advent make it an increasingly anomalous 
 
 240. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). See generally 
Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459 (2013) (examining the role of 
reliance arguments in the doctrine of stare decisis); Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to 
Precedent, 47 GA. L. REV. 1035 (2013) (same). 
 241. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) (“Considerations in favor of stare decisis 
are at their acme in cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests are 
involved; the opposite is true in cases . . . involving procedural and evidentiary rules.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 242. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 243. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 388–93, 403–05 (1970). 
BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017  11:16 AM 
2017] ONE GOOD PLAINTIFF 537 
outlier.244 
First, the Supreme Court has become increasingly granular in its 
standing inquiries in single-plaintiff scenarios. The law is now clear that 
a single plaintiff must satisfy standing requirements for every claim that 
the plaintiff asserts. The Supreme Court’s most extensive discussion 
came in DaimlerChrysler. The plaintiffs in that case challenged the 
legality of both a municipal tax exemption and a state tax credit. The 
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the 
state tax credit.245 In response to the plaintiffs’ argument that their 
assumed standing to challenge the municipal tax exemption gave them 
a form of supplemental standing to bring their related challenge to the 
state tax credit, the Court turned them away. “[O]ur standing cases 
confirm,” the Court ruled, “that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing 
for each claim he seeks to press.”246 No Justice dissented.247 
Indeed, the Court has gone beyond even claim-specific standing, 
requiring as well that a plaintiff demonstrate standing as to each form 
of relief sought. Illustrative in this regard is City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons,248 in which the Court held that a motorist who had been choked 
by the police could seek damages for his past injury but, in light of the 
absence of a real threat of recurrence, lacked standing to seek 
injunctive relief to prevent future harm.249 
Second, the one-plaintiff rule was developed before Steel Co.’s 
rejection of hypothetical jurisdiction, the practice whereby a court 
 
 244. Depending on its future membership, the Court could shift toward more lenient standing 
rules in certain respects. For example, in cases involving plaintiffs with somewhat speculative 
injuries, or in cases in which Congress has given individual consumers the right to enforce 
technical regulatory requirements through provisions for statutory damages, the Court may come 
out differently in the future than it has in the recent past. But any reasonably foreseeable Supreme 
Court is unlikely to abandon its largely formalistic approach (honored sometimes in the breach, 
to be sure) about the mandatory, jurisdictional nature of Article III standing. The one-plaintiff 
rule is therefore likely to remain anomalous even if the Court’s doctrine shifts a bit this way or 
that. 
 245. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006). 
 246. Id. at 352 (emphasis added).  
 247. Justice Ginsburg filed a separate concurrence to express disagreement with some of the 
limitations on standing that the Court has developed since the 1970s, but she did not object to the 
every-claim rule in particular. Id. at 354–55 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 248. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).  
 249. Id. at 105, 109. I am uncomfortable with this aspect of the Court’s current approach to 
standing. But discomfort with Lyons’s remedy-specific approach to standing is perfectly 
compatible with rejection of the one-plaintiff rule, which gives judgments to persons without 
standing to seek any relief whatsoever. 
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could pretermit discussion of standing in order to dismiss a case on the 
merits.250 As discussed already,251 the one-plaintiff rule conflicts with 
Steel Co.’s proposition that assuming jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
merits is ultra vires for an Article III court, and it also clashes with Steel 
Co.’s broader reluctance to bypass jurisdictional hurdles in the name 
of judicial economy. 
There is at least one aspect of current standing law that does fit 
comfortably with the one-plaintiff rule, and that is the doctrine of 
associational standing. According to this doctrine, an organization has 
standing to sue if at least one of its members would have standing as an 
individual, the interests at stake are related to the association’s 
purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor the requested relief 
requires the individual members’ participation.252 Associational 
standing has a superficial resemblance to supplemental-plaintiff 
standing in that one entity’s standing is sufficient to confer standing on 
another, but the theory behind the two doctrines is quite different. 
Associational standing is a form of representational standing in which 
the association stands in the shoes of its affected members.253 In the 
usual multiple-plaintiff case in which the one-plaintiff rule is applied, 
the parties who obtain the benefit of the rule do not stand in any such 
representational relationship; they merely have the same legal claim as 
the other plaintiffs.254 The doctrine of associational standing therefore 
stands even if the one-plaintiff rule falls.255 
 
 250. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–95 (1998). 
 251. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 252. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). This form of 
standing is typically employed in cases seeking declaratory or injunctive relief; the joinder of the 
affected members as parties is often necessary when the complaint seeks damages for the 
members. Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515–16 (1975) (requiring joinder of members 
for damages claims), with United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., 
Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 553 (1996) (allowing organization to seek damages for members). This form of 
associational standing should be distinguished from the related doctrine according to which an 
organization has standing to seek redress for its own injuries suffered as an organization. See, e.g., 
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982). 
 253. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751, 517 U.S. at 555, 557. 
 254. Cf. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 896–98 (2008) (distinguishing, in the preclusion 
context, between representative relationships and mere shared interests). 
 255. Alternatively, one could challenge the correctness of associational standing as well, such 
as because it has the effect of circumventing Rule 23 or other legal requirements for establishing 
representational relationships. Eliminating associational standing would not be very disruptive 
because of the availability of suits brought by affected members (who could be represented by 
the organization as counsel) and class actions. The Supreme Court, however, has not shown an 
interest in revisiting the basic soundness of associational standing. See Int’l Union v. Brock, 477 
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The one-plaintiff rule, is, in short, “a derelict in the stream of the 
law.”256 The overall coherence of the Supreme Court’s standing 
doctrine would be improved were it overruled.257 
3. Ill-Considered and Unexplained.  Suppose a court exercises 
jurisdiction over a case without any discussion of the propriety of doing 
so. According to the Supreme Court, unexamined assumptions of 
jurisdiction do not establish precedent that controls a later case in 
which the jurisdictional question is actually put into controversy.258 
That is not exactly the situation we confront in the cases applying 
the one-plaintiff rule, but one could make a similar argument 
oppugning the precedential value of those cases. Although the cases 
repeating the rule do not simply assume jurisdiction sub silentio, they 
do state it only in passing, without reflection, often in a footnote and 
rarely spending more than one sentence on it.259 Further, the rule 
originally developed in a rather casual way, without adverse briefing 
from the parties or, so far as one can tell, careful judicial deliberation. 
The Supreme Court has never provided a justification for the one-
plaintiff rule, whether to explain how it is consistent with standing 
doctrine or why the rule is valuable enough to allow a departure from 
 
U.S. 274, 288–90 (1986). 
 256. N.D. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 167 (1973). 
 257. Zimmerman uses the Court’s practice in severability analysis to undermine the Court’s 
generally claim-specific approach to standing and, along the way, briefly discusses the one-
plaintiff rule as another doctrine that is in tension with the claim-specific approach. Zimmerman, 
supra note 155, at 337–38. I agree with him that there is tension between the multiple-claim cases 
(like DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno), which expressly reject a form of supplemental standing, and the 
multiple-plaintiff cases, which allow uninjured plaintiffs to tag along. But we differ on how to 
resolve the tension. It is the multiple-plaintiff cases that are out of step, from a coherentist 
perspective, with the larger pattern of particular doctrines and underlying principles of standing. 
(I believe that severability, which is his main focus, presents rather different issues that are not 
best understood as shedding light on standing one way or the other.) Coherence therefore 
supports eliminating the one-plaintiff anomaly. Again, I myself have some doubts about aspects 
of the Court’s standing doctrine, but whatever one thinks standing requires, all plaintiffs require 
it. 
 258. E.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 144–45 (2011); see also Steel 
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998) (denying the precedential value of “drive-
by jurisdictional rulings”). 
 259. E.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 432 n.19 (1998) (“Because both the City 
of New York and the health care [plaintiffs-]appellees have standing, we need not consider 
whether the [plaintiff-]appellee unions also have standing to sue.”); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 n.9 (1977) (“Because of the presence of this plaintiff, 
we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to 
maintain the suit.”). 
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ordinary principles of standing. The closest the Court has come was 
this passage in Doe v. Bolton, one of the first Supreme Court decisions 
to announce the one-plaintiff rule: 
We conclude that we need not pass upon the status of these additional 
appellants in this suit, for the issues are sufficiently and adequately 
presented by Doe and the physician-appellants, and nothing is gained 
or lost by the presence or absence of the nurses, the clergymen, the 
social workers, and the corporations.260 
The implicit theory here appears to be that a finding of standing makes 
no difference (“nothing is gained or lost”) and so the analysis can be 
skipped, presumably as a matter of judicial convenience. The Court 
neglects to consider either the practical consequences of party status or 
the formal validity of dispensing with a ruling on constitutional 
jurisdiction. 
The Court’s attention in the early cases applying the one-plaintiff 
rule was, somewhat understandably, focused elsewhere than on 
standing doctrine. None of the early cases were cases in which the 
Court addressed only standing; standing was discussed on the way to a 
holding on the merits. And those decisions on the merits were 
significant, sometimes momentous, such that the Court’s attention was 
surely directed toward substance rather than standing. Several of the 
early cases were abortion cases, and one of the others was the campaign 
finance landmark Buckley v. Valeo,261 which was decided under 
unusually rushed circumstances.262 
In sum, the Supreme Court’s creation and propagation of the one-
plaintiff rule has not been particularly thoughtful or deliberate. As 
such, the rule should not enjoy the respect the Court ordinarily accords 
its precedents. 
E. What Courts Should Do in Multiple-Plaintiff Cases with Doubtful 
 
 260. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973). This passage is followed by a citation to Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), but that case did not apply the one-plaintiff rule. Rather, the Court 
found that plaintiff Roe had standing and then went on to rule that the Does, a married couple 
who also sued, lacked standing. Id. at 127–29. 
 261. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).  
 262. See Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTION 
L.J. 241, 242 (2003) (describing the “rushed drafting by committee” that characterized the 
Buckley opinion). 
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Standing 
Let us suppose that the Supreme Court sees the light and 
repudiates or seriously limits the one-plaintiff rule. How, in that new 
regime, should courts assess standing in multiple-plaintiff cases? The 
basic rule is simple: courts need to assess the standing of all plaintiffs 
rather than effectively assuming the standing of every plaintiff upon 
finding that one plaintiff has standing. To be clear, a court should not 
dismiss a case in its entirety if it finds that some but not all plaintiffs 
lack standing. Just as one plaintiff’s standing should not transfer to 
another plaintiff, neither should one plaintiff’s lack of standing 
undermine the standing of another plaintiff and bar an injured party 
from the courts. What should happen is that the court should proceed 
to the merits only with regard to the proper plaintiff(s), dismissing the 
other(s). 
The approach just stated is simple enough, but its proper 
implementation varies according to the circumstances. In particular, 
the rule works a bit differently in different courts, so we should 
separately consider the mechanics in the district courts, courts of 
appeals, and Supreme Court. 
1. The Supreme Court.  For the Supreme Court, it should be simple 
to do the right thing. The discretionary character of the Court’s docket 
provides ample opportunities to honor the requirements of Article III 
standing without causing the Court inconvenience. 
To begin with, the Court can reduce the need for the one-plaintiff 
rule through its choices at the certiorari stage. Questions that are worth 
a place on the Court’s docket rarely appear in only one case. When 
deciding whether a particular multiple-plaintiff case presents the best 
vehicle for reviewing a particular legal question, the Court could 
consider whether the standing of all plaintiffs is secure. 
Once the Court has granted certiorari, it has several options. Most 
obviously, it could consider the standing of all parties and dismiss those 
found to lack standing, as it sometimes does already.263 One virtue of 
this approach is that it would provide litigants and lower courts 
additional guidance on close matters of standing. (Of course, the Court 
may not want to provide such guidance, either because it wishes to 
preserve its own future flexibility or because it does not regard the time 
 
 263. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (citing examples of the Court doing this). 
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as well spent.) 
But the Court need not undertake a per-plaintiff inquiry if that 
would be inconvenient. If the Court determines that one party has 
standing, the Court could decide the merits as to that party and could 
remand for further consideration of the other plaintiffs’ standing—an 
approach that would be especially appealing if the Court is going to 
remand for other reasons anyway. The proceedings on remand might 
not actually occur: if the Court reaches the merits as to any party and 
creates nationwide precedent, issues involving other plaintiffs would 
typically be settled without further judicial involvement. That would 
almost certainly be true when the case involves injunctive relief against 
a government defendant. 
Finally, the Court could dismiss certiorari as improvidently 
granted (DIG) as to the troublesome plaintiffs. A dismissal does not 
amount to an adjudication even of standing, let alone of the merits, but 
simply leaves the dismissed matter as it was had certiorari never been 
granted.264 That would mean leaving in place a decision the correctness 
of which the Court is not certain, but of course the Court does that all 
the time by denying certiorari outright in the vast majority of cases that 
are brought to its attention. 
2. Courts of Appeals.  As before, the basic rule is that the court 
may not decide the merits as to a particular party when that party’s 
standing remains unresolved. One obvious disposition, which courts 
sometimes use already, is to decide the standing of all plaintiffs, order 
the dismissal of those who lack it, and decide the merits as to those who 
have it.265 Yet other options are available too, for courts have some 
flexibility regarding when and how a question of standing is taken up.266 
Especially when a fact-intensive issue of standing is raised for the first 
 
 264. See generally Michael E. Solimine & Rafael Gely, The Supreme Court and the DIG: An 
Empirical and Institutional Analysis, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1421 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
DIG practice). Although a DIG usually dismisses the whole case, the Court can DIG part of a 
case but not all of it. See id. at 1434. A different procedural route to a similar outcome is illustrated 
by Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999). The Court had 
before it two appeals from different lower courts that had been consolidated for oral argument. 
After resolving the merits of one of the cases, the court dismissed the other appeal because that 
case “no longer present[ed] a substantial federal question.” Id. at 344. That second appeal 
involved serious questions as to standing, as the plaintiff was the House of Representatives. 
 265. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 19, 45. 
 266. See generally Justin Pidot, Jurisdictional Procedure, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2012) 
(discussing various ways that courts deal with jurisdictional questions that arise on appeal). 
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time on appeal, the appellate court might remand the question of the 
standing of one or more plaintiffs to the district court for that court to 
consider standing in the first instance.267 There is no apparent barrier 
to a mixed disposition in which a court of appeals decides the merits as 
to a party it finds to have standing and remands for further 
investigation into the standing of others. In many such cases, no further 
proceedings would take place, as the parties would voluntarily resolve 
the case in light of the merits ruling occasioned by the proper plaintiff’s 
claim. Thus can some of the efficiency benefits of the one-plaintiff rule 
often be had, and without violating Article III. 
3. District Courts.  For every plaintiff as to whom the opposing 
party has raised a genuine question regarding standing, or as to whom 
standing looks questionable to the court even without any objection 
from the opposing party, the court must look into the issue and decide 
whether standing is proper. In other words, the court should be as 
vigilant about standing in multiple-plaintiff cases as it would be in a 
single-plaintiff case.268 
The duty to resolve a question of standing does not mean that a 
district court must decide on the standing of all parties the moment a 
question about standing appears. In single-plaintiff cases, although 
standing is a threshold issue that the court must not ignore, a district 
court need not follow a rigid timetable for deciding standing. If a court 
is unable to resolve a standing question when it initially presents itself, 
the court may order discovery or additional briefing on the matter.269 
A district court might rule that one party has standing but rule that the 
 
 267. One might wonder whether a court of appeals has jurisdiction to order a remand when 
standing, and thus its own jurisdiction, is questionable. A court has jurisdiction to determine its 
jurisdiction. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002). Likewise, it has at least enough 
jurisdiction to remand to the district court for that court to determine its jurisdiction. E.g., Belleri 
v. United States, 712 F.3d 543, 549 (11th Cir. 2013); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper 
Recycling Corp., 263 F. App’x 348, 356 (4th Cir. 2008).  
 268. As in a single-plaintiff case, the court can in certain circumstances dismiss a plaintiff’s 
claim for threshold nonmerits reasons without satisfying itself of subject-matter jurisdiction. See 
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007); supra notes 207–
-09 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to Steel Co.’s “jurisdiction first” rule). 
 269. See 5B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1350, at 250–55 (3d ed. 2004). Joshi and Professor Redish argue that judges should 
resolve questions of standing as soon as possible, even when there are factual disputes over 
standing that overlap with determinative questions on the merits. Redish & Joshi, supra note 195, 
at 1388. I am not sure I would push so hard to have judges decide such overlapping questions. But 
I agree with them that courts should not pretermit standing completely, which is what the one-
plaintiff rule does. 
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standing of other parties requires further factual or legal development. 
A ruling that at least one party has standing may well be enough to 
encourage the other plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss their claims or 
cause the defendant to settle the case. Knowing that a ruling on only 
one plaintiff’s standing could have such effects on the parties, a 
settlement-minded district judge might telegraph during a hearing or 
status conference that such a ruling is forthcoming. A further bit of 
flexibility comes from the fact that an initial ruling on standing that is 
made with only limited time and information, such as when ruling on 
interim relief, can be revisited later.270 
4. The Special Case of Class Actions.  Recall the dispute over 
whether absent class members must have standing.271 Despite the 
constitutional garb in which the issue is often clothed, most of the issues 
surrounding the standing of class members are actually better 
understood as questions about whether a class should be certified and 
how the class should be defined, questions that involve Rule 23 and 
substantive law more than they involve Article III.272 
Consider a damages case in which a class alleges that the 
defendant misrepresented the features of a product. If the proposed 
class is to be defined as all purchasers of the product, then the 
defendant might object that the proposed class would violate Article 
III because some members were not injured by the defendant’s 
misrepresentations.273 But suppose that the substantive law effectively 
presumes reliance through a representation’s effect on the market 
price, as in “fraud on the market” securities cases.274 Or suppose that 
all members of the class were exposed to the same objectively 
deceptive representations about the product and that an individual 
plaintiff could win under a state consumer protection law without 
 
 270. See, e.g., Am. Canoe Ass’n v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505, 516 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(ruling that the district court should have revisited its initial ruling on standing after further factual 
development). 
 271. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 272. See 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 67, § 2:3 (explaining that questions about the standing of 
class members have caused confusion in the courts and that “[m]ost courts concerned about the 
standing of absent class members are in fact concerned about whether the class is properly 
defined”). 
 273. E.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Gutierrez, 136 S. Ct. 1512 
(2016) (No. 14-1230), 2015 WL 1642015 (presenting an argument along these lines). 
 274. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–47 (1988). 
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testifying that he or she actually relied on the representations.275 In 
both of those cases, the defendant does not have a good Article III 
standing argument, because the substantive law controls the elements 
of the claim.276 Consider by way of contrast a scenario in which actual 
reliance is an element of the claim and varying oral representations 
were made by hundreds of individual salespeople. In that case, the 
defendant has a good argument against certification of a class—
because the variations in the putative class members’ circumstances 
make certification improper in light of Rule 23’s requirements of 
commonality, typicality, and predominance.277 
Or take the case of a group of purchasers of a defectively designed 
or manufactured product that has manifested its defect in only a small 
number of cases. The proposed class is composed of all purchasers of 
the product. The defendant might assert an Article III objection 
because the class contains “uninjured” members. But, again, whether 
purchasers are injured depends on the applicable substantive law, 
which could require only the purchase of a product containing a value-
impairing defect despite absence of manifestation. If the substantive 
law instead requires further injury beyond purchase of the product and 
purchasers have varying experiences with the product, then a class 
composed of all purchasers is probably inappropriate. A more 
narrowly defined class could be perfectly acceptable on Article III and 
Rule 23 grounds. 
The controversy over the one-plaintiff rule has mostly arisen in 
class actions in which damages are sought. Other types of cases, such 
as Rule 23(b)(2) injunction class actions, should present less difficulty. 
In a school-desegregation case, to pick a classic 23(b)(2) scenario, all 
of the plaintiffs are relevantly affected by the defendant’s actions in the 
same way, so one brief standing analysis could easily cover all of the 
plaintiffs. That Article III requires all plaintiffs to have standing does 
not, however, mean that Article III requires that all plaintiffs in a case 
have the same injury. If, to use another example, different categories 
of prisoners are affected by different prison deficiencies, then the 
proper course of action might be to have multiple classes or subclasses 
 
 275. See, e.g., In re Tobacco II Cases, 207 P.3d 20, 38–41 (Cal. 2009). 
 276. The Supreme Court could limit legislatures’ ability to define such claims (on Article III 
or due process grounds), but in that case no plaintiff would be able to sue on such a claim, whether 
individually or as a class representative or as a class member. The one-plaintiff rule would not be 
involved. 
 277. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2)–(3), (b)(3). 
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with separate representatives. But that result is required, if it is 
required at all, by Rule 23 rather than by Article III.278 
5. The Special Case of Prudential Standing.  In addition to the 
requirements of Article III, there are “judicially self-imposed,” 
“prudential” limits on standing.279 As compared to the Article III 
standing requirements, the prudential requirements are avowedly 
more flexible and more responsive to the demands of good sense under 
the circumstances.280 Although the one-plaintiff rule is not appropriate 
when it comes to Article III standing, it is acceptable for at least some 
kinds of prudential standing. 
An example of the use of the one-plaintiff rule to bypass an 
inquiry into prudential standing comes from Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.281 In that case, a 
housing developer’s plan to build a low- and moderate-income housing 
project was thwarted by a local government’s zoning decision. The 
developer satisfied the constitutional standing requirements.282 One of 
the developer’s claims was that the government’s zoning decision was 
unconstitutionally arbitrary and irrational.283 The more promising 
claim, however, was that the zoning decision was racially 
discriminatory, and that was a claim that the developer, as a corporate 
entity with no racial identity, could not raise on its own behalf.284 Were 
the developer the only plaintiff, the Court would need to consider 
whether, despite the prudential rule disfavoring third-party standing, 
the developer should nonetheless be allowed to raise the equal-
protection rights of its prospective minority tenants. But the Court did 
not need to undertake that prudential standing analysis. The Court had 
before it “at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated 
standing to assert these [equal-protection] rights as his own”—namely, 
an African-American co-plaintiff interested in living in the planned 
development.285 Satisfied that the constitutional and prudential 
 
 278. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5) (providing for subclasses); see also 4 RUBINSTEIN, supra note 
67, § 4:34 (discussing whether “cohesiveness” is required in (b)(2) class actions). 
 279. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984). 
 280. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686–89 (2013); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190, 193–94 (1976). 
 281. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 282. Id. at 261.  
 283. Id. at 263 (citing, inter alia, Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). 
 284. Id. at 263. 
 285. Id. at 263–64. In addition, and more problematically, the Court in Village of Arlington 
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prerequisites were satisfied, the Court then reached the merits and 
rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.286 
The Court’s decision to bypass the developer’s prudential standing 
was permissible even under the theory urged in this Article. The policy 
considerations that animate the usual limitations on third-party 
standing—in particular, worries about unnecessary judicial decisions 
and lack of concrete adverseness287—had no application in the case at 
hand. Indeed, in light of the flexible nature of the prudential standing 
limitations, courts facing multiple-plaintiff cases with third-party 
standing issues could go further than just bypassing the prudential 
analysis for extra plaintiffs. Instead, a court might justifiably decide 
that all plaintiffs affirmatively satisfy the prudential requirements 
because one plaintiff satisfies them, as long as the extra plaintiffs’ 
presence in the case would not add any complications. 
The example above concerns the third-party standing strand of 
prudential standing; the analysis for other forms of prudential standing 
is different, if indeed those other forms still exist. The Supreme Court 
recently held that the supposedly prudential doctrine requiring that a 
plaintiff fall within the “zone of interests” protected by a statute is not 
a standing doctrine at all, prudential or otherwise, but is instead just 
the merits question whether the statute, properly construed, confers a 
cause of action on a person like the plaintiff.288 So conceived, it seems 
inescapable that a court cannot go ahead and grant relief to a party 
without a cause of action just because a co-plaintiff does have a cause 
of action. As for the “generalized grievance” branch of prudential 
standing, it may be that some cases in that category actually involve 
Article III abstractness problems.289 In any event, there would be little 
role for the one-plaintiff rule in this kind of case, as it should not often 
happen that one plaintiff’s grievance is too generalized to satisfy the 
prudential requirement while a co-plaintiff’s grievance is not, for the 
one-plaintiff rule applies only when the plaintiffs present the same 
legal issues.290 
 
Heights also assumed that still other plaintiffs had standing, this time apparently of the Article III 
variety. Id. at 264 n.9. 
 286. Id. at 270. 
 287. See 13A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 59, § 3531.9, at 662–72 (describing the policies 
behind the prudential rule against raising the rights of others). 
 288. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386–88 (2014). 
 289. See id. at 1387 n.3. 
 290. See supra Part I.B.3. 
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IV.  HOW THIS MISTAKE HAPPENED (AND WHAT IT REVEALS) 
If the one-plaintiff rule is so wrong, how did it come to seem so 
right to so many courts, with only a few courts questioning it? Some 
explanations have already surfaced: the Supreme Court has never 
really thought the issue through, and the rule is usually applied in cases 
in which its consequences are not immediately visible to courts, 
especially for appellate courts removed from the practicalities of 
remedies.291 Beyond those general explanations, there are a few factors 
that help to explain why the one-plaintiff rule in particular could arise. 
The spread of the one-plaintiff rule can plausibly be explained as the 
result of two kinds of factors, one material and one ideological. More 
specifically, the fault lies with the incentives of courts and litigants on 
the one hand and with problematic features of our contemporary legal 
culture on the other. 
A. Institutional Incentives 
Part of the explanation for the one-plaintiff rule’s advent and 
persistence is that actors in the legal system have some incentives to 
perpetuate it and too few incentives to correct it. 
1. Judicial Self-Interest.  The one-plaintiff rule serves the interests 
of courts, though it does so differently for the Supreme Court and the 
lower courts. For all of the Supreme Court’s talk about the role of 
constitutional standing as a “fundamental,” “crucial,” irreducible 
restriction on judicial power,292 the Court’s actions show that its greater 
interest—at least when it comes to its own docket—is to pronounce on 
the pressing legal issues of the day. The cases in which the Supreme 
Court has invoked the one-plaintiff rule have almost never been only 
about standing. Rather, the cases have discussed standing on the way 
to resolving the merits issue that attracted the Court’s attention, often 
a merits issue involving sensitive matters like abortion or race. When 
one is focused on resolving the merits of a great public controversy, it 
must be tempting indeed to sidestep thorny questions of standing that 
do not seem to make a practical difference to the impact of the ruling.293 
 
 291. See supra Part I.B.1–2. 
 292. E.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 293. Cf. H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE 107 (1991) (noting that the Court sometimes 
“skip[s] over jurisdictional problems quite cavalierly” rather than addressing them or dismissing 
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Lower courts, for their part, labor under a heavy workload; they 
cannot simply deny certiorari as a way of managing their dockets.294 For 
them, there are obvious and understandable incentives to avoid 
undertaking difficult, time-consuming inquiries, especially when it 
appears that resolution of an issue will not affect the outcome on the 
merits.295 In various contexts, therefore, the lower courts have sought 
decisionmaking shortcuts even when the Supreme Court has tried to 
prohibit them.296 Through the one-plaintiff rule, the Supreme Court has 
officially licensed a shortcut, so it is not surprising to see the lower 
courts embrace it with gusto. 
2. Litigants’ Incentives To Disregard Standing.  The typical case in 
which the one-plaintiff rule is invoked is one in which plaintiffs 
challenge the legality of some governmental policy and seek 
declaratory and injunctive relief. Governmental defendants in such 
scenarios often lack the incentive to challenge plaintiffs’ standing at all, 
let alone the standing of additional plaintiffs when one plaintiff has 
standing. 
Consider the situation in which all plaintiffs in a given case may 
well lack standing but some potential plaintiffs somewhere probably 
have it. In King v. Burwell, the 2015 case challenging the availability of 
subsidies under the Affordable Care Act, there were serious doubts 
about the standing of most of the plaintiffs, perhaps all of them.297 Let 
us suppose that careful investigation would have shown that none of 
the plaintiffs had standing. Still, the government would have little 
incentive to seek dismissal on that ground. Plenty of other potential 
plaintiffs throughout the country certainly had standing to challenge 
 
certiorari as improvidently granted). 
 294. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 851, 
865–68 (2014). 
 295. Cf. Scott C. Idleman, The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 235, 305–14 (1999) (discussing factors that contributed to the popularity of 
hypothetical jurisdiction). 
 296. See, e.g., Campiti v. Matesanz, 333 F.3d 317, 321–22 (1st Cir. 2003). The court in Campiti 
explained: 
Only as a last resort should the circuit courts read Supreme Court decisions to 
create . . . mandatory [sequencing] priorities. A circuit court judge may, in an average 
circuit, be responsible for 50 full-scale opinions a year and may vote on several hundred 
merits cases. . . . Anything that precludes judges from taking the shortest distance to a 
result impairs their ability to give truly difficult cases the time they require. 
Id. 
 297. See Bagley, supra note 12; Weiner, supra note 12. 
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the subsidies, and, win or lose, the government had an interest in 
obtaining the Supreme Court’s definitive resolution of the subsidies’ 
legality. 
Even more clearly, government defendants ordinarily have little 
or no incentive to seek dismissal of uninjured plaintiffs when at least 
one plaintiff clearly has standing. That is because the government will 
often give the benefit of a pro-plaintiff ruling to all persons, whether 
they were parties or not. That is most obviously the case when the 
decision comes from the Supreme Court. Today it is only barely 
conceivable that government officials would treat a Supreme Court 
decision as applicable only to the named plaintiffs while continuing to 
act on their own contrary understanding of the law as to all other 
persons similarly situated.298 Even when a decision comes from a lower 
court, government officials will often acquiesce in rulings that they (at 
least officially) opposed, choosing to give the ruling a power not 
required by its judgment, which is limited to the parties, or even by its 
precedential effect, which is especially limited for district court 
decisions.299 Government officials may act this way for a variety of 
reasons: because they find the court’s reasoning convincing, because 
they predict that future cases will come out the same way, because they 
misunderstand the limited force of the decision, or because they wish 
to use the court’s ruling as an excuse to let them follow preferences that 
differ from their constituents’ wishes. 
Now, to be sure, the incentives to challenge standing are very 
different in certain other contexts. In class actions seeking damages, 
defendants have a strong incentive to litigate vigorously on all fronts, 
including by casting their objections in constitutional and jurisdictional 
terms so as to make them seem more urgent. And so it is not surprising 
that the one-plaintiff rule has encountered opposition in the class 
 
 298. But see William Baude, Could Obama Bypass the Supreme Court?, N.Y. TIMES, March 
17, 2015, at A27 (arguing that the Obama administration was not required to obey a potential 
adverse ruling in King v. Burwell, and should not do so, with respect to people besides the 
plaintiffs in the case). What is much more common is for actors who dislike a Supreme Court 
ruling to give the Court’s holding a narrow scope even if they do not question the decision’s 
applicability beyond the parties.  
 299. See, e.g., Blackman & Wasserman, supra note 149, at 257–72 (discussing state and local 
officials’ voluntary compliance with lower court rulings on same-sex marriage); cf. Galvan v. 
Levine, 490 F.2d 1255, 1261–62 (2d Cir. 1973) (explaining that class certification was properly 
denied as unnecessary where the government defendant would apply the ruling to all persons 
similarly situated). 
BRUHL IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017  11:16 AM 
2017] ONE GOOD PLAINTIFF 551 
context, as discussed earlier.300 
B. Culture 
The development of the one-plaintiff rule also reflects and reveals 
certain features of contemporary legal culture, more specifically 
certain views about the nature of judicial power and our tendency to 
take the Supreme Court as the model for all courts. 
The success of the one-plaintiff rule reflects the ascendance of a 
particular view of the judicial role. Academic debate still rages over the 
desirability of different versions of judicial supremacy on the one hand 
and departmentalism on the other.301 The basic question in that debate 
involves the power of a judicial ruling, rooted in a dispute between 
particular parties, to settle the law for all persons and places. Despite 
the continuing academic debate, judicial supremacy today controls 
most of the territory, especially in the minds of judges, such that the 
question is just how far it will triumph. Similarly, it is widely 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court has been moving ever closer to 
embodying the law-declaration model of the judicial function and 
eschewing the more modest dispute-resolution function.302 The Court 
accordingly cares little for the particulars of the factual circumstances 
and potential remedies applicable to the specific litigants before it. The 
joint rise of judicial supremacy and the law-declaration model means 
that the Supreme Court promulgates directives on national law that are 
regarded as final and binding with respect to all potential disputes 
within their scope. Both of these developments have in common the 
erosion of the distinction between party and nonparty status. The one-
plaintiff rule, as already observed, relies on the breakdown of that same 
distinction.303 If parties and nonparties alike are bound or benefitted by 
a decision announcing national law, it makes little sense to be careful 
 
 300. Supra Part I.B.1. 
 301. See, e.g., Symposium, Judicial Supremacy vs. Departmentalism, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1433 (2017). 
 302. See Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901, 
1952–53 (2016); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related 
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 668–69 (2012); see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case 
for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56–59 (2009) (arguing that law declaration is the 
proper approach for the modern Supreme Court); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of 
the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 432–38 (describing the Supreme Court’s 
“Olympian” posture). For further discussion of these two aspects of adjudication, see supra notes 
118–20 and accompanying text.  
 303. See supra Part II. 
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about sorting the one from the other. 
That the one-plaintiff rule should go unquestioned in the Supreme 
Court is not especially surprising given the Court’s lawmaking role, 
but, in the nature of things, the vast majority of cases invoking the rule 
come from the lower courts. In the lower courts, the distinction 
between party and nonparty is more consequential because the 
precedential effect of lower court rulings is geographically limited or 
nonexistent.304 The one-plaintiff rule should therefore be more 
obviously problematic in those courts. That the one-plaintiff rule has 
been embraced even in the lower courts suggests that the lower courts 
increasingly see their role in law-declaration terms. 
The nearly unquestioned acceptance of the one-plaintiff rule is of 
a piece with other developments signaling the relative erosion of the 
dispute-resolution model in the lower courts. The use of the one-
plaintiff rule dovetails, for example, with the relatively recent practice 
of district courts regularly granting nationwide injunctions barring the 
federal government from enforcing a statute or policy against any 
person anywhere in the country.305 More generally, it has become 
common to hear talk of lower courts “striking down” a law in whole or 
in part as a remedy for a constitutional defect.306 It would be more 
precise, not to mention judicially modest, to say that a court has held 
that a law cannot validly be applied to the plaintiff(s) before the court. 
Commentators have long observed that any public-law case before the 
Supreme Court is, even when prosecuted by a single plaintiff, 
functionally similar to a class action.307 The one-plaintiff rule is 
symptomatic of the slide toward a world in which all cases against the 
government have this class-like cast, even in the district courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The one-plaintiff rule has been accepted into the mainstream of 
federal practice with little notice. It is understandable that the rule 
should spread, for its effects are often hard to see and, partly for that 
 
 304. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text.  
 305. See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text (describing and criticizing this practice). 
 306. See Bray, supra note 16 (manuscript at 43–44) (observing this tendency and linking it to 
the rise of nationwide injunctions); cf. Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 738, 755–57 (2010) (distinguishing between the historic concept of displacing repugnant law 
and the modern notion of striking down law). 
 307. See Miller, supra note 122, at 574.  
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reason, litigants and courts often have little incentive to object to the 
rule. Further, the rule’s acceptance makes sense when one considers 
that it stands comfortably alongside other relatively recent 
developments, like routine nationwide injunctions, that reflect and 
reinforce notions of judicial power that emphasize law declaration over 
retail-level dispute resolution. But even if the one-plaintiff rule’s 
acceptance is understandable, the rule is wrong, and, if one looks more 
closely, it is wrong in consequential ways. Courts should stop using it. 
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APPENDIX: SUPREME COURT CASES INVOKING THE ONE-PLAINTIFF 
RULE 
Case name and citation 
Did parties granted 
supplemental standing 
win308 on the merits in 
the Supreme Court? 
Town of Chester, N.Y. v. Laroe Estates, Inc., 
137 S. Ct. 1645 (2017) 
N/A 
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 446–47 (2009) Yes 
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 
U.S. 181, 189 n.7 (2008) 
No 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 498 
(2007) 
Yes 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional 
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006) 
No 
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 n.1 
(2005) (mootness) 
Yes 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003) Yes 
Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826 n.1 
(2002) 
No 
Dep’t of Commerce v. U.S. House of 
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they also lost in part. Town of Chester is the only case in which the Court considered only standing 
and not the merits. 
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